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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this court is conferred pursuant to the
provisions of Section 78-2a-3 (h) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
This action involves the defendant's appeal of certain provisions of
the Decree of Divorce signed and entered by the Honorable John A.
Rokich, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County/ Utah, on April 26, 1989. Notice of Appeal was filed on May
24/ 1989. The plaintiff has not filed a Cross-Appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In dividing the marital estate the trial court can enter such
orders

concerning

property

distribution

and

alimony

as

are

equitable. Utah Code Ann./ Section 30-3-5 (1987). "In making such
orders,

the

trial

court

is permitted

broad

latitude, and its

judgment is not to be lightly disturbed/ so long as it exercises its
discretion

in accordance with the standard set by this Court."

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987); Weston v. Weston,
107 Utah Adv. Rep. 78, 79.
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's factual
findings, an appellant must marshall all of the evidence in support
of the trial courtfs

findings and then demonstrate that, even

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings,
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070

(Utah 1985), cited with approval in

-1-

Schindler v. Schindler,

776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case. Elizabeth, plaintiff/respondent, filed
a complaint for divorce, for custody of the parties1 three children,
for child support, alimony, division of the parties1 property, and
attorney's fees. David, defendant/appellant, filed an Answer and
subsequent motions, disputing all of the plaintiff's claims and
alleging that he should be awarded custody of the children.
Numerous hearings took place before the 5-day trial. The
defendant continued to press his claims for custody of the children,
even though neither of the evaluations which had been prepared
recommended that he should be awarded custody. After the trial, the
proceedings

continued,

both

in open court and through various

affidavits and memoranda filed with the court. There was vigorous
debate over the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Divorce, which, after modification, in conformance with
the orders of the court, were signed and entered on April 26, 1989.
The Decree of Divorce granted the plaintiff a divorce and
awarded her custody of the children, alimony, child support, a share
of the children's day-care expenses, approximately

half of the

marital property, and less than half of her attorney's fees and
costs.
Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree
of Divorce are included in the Addendum to this Brief. Also included
are copies of: (a) the plaintiff's revised Financial Declaration (R.

-2-

107-110); (b) a letter from the defendant's trial attorney to the
court, dated February 10, 1989 (R. 132-133); (c) a letter from the
plaintiff's attorney to the court, dated February 21, 1989 (R. 141);
(d) defendant's Proposals for Custody Arrangements memorandum, filed
with the court on March 6, 1989 (R. 149); (e) affidavit for
plaintiff's attorney's fees( (R. 161-169; (f) defendant's Request
for Clarification of Minute Entry, Objections, etc* filed with the
court on April 18, 1989, (R. 194-220); (g) defendant's Motion to
Stay (R. 329-330); (h) plaintiff's Notice of Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment and Property Transfer (R. 336); (i) and, plaintiff's Notice
in re Judgment on Merrill Lynch Accounts).
The Notice of Appeal was filed on May 24, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Marital History.
The parties met while attending the Southwestern Baptist
Seminary. They married in Jackson, Mississippi, on June 27, 1981.
From the very beginning of the marriage, David subjected Elizabeth
to mental and physical abuse (Tr. 7,8). He demanded total submission
(Tr. 16). Approximately two years before she filed for divorce,
following a particularly violent confrontation, Elizabeth realized
that she could not endure the abuse any more and became more
assertive. This served to increase David's anger at her refusal to
be a subr;iTsive wife (Tr. 14,15).
Elizabeth testified that before she realized the necessity of
becoming more assertive in dealing with David. "...I felt like I was
-3-

pleasing the Lord by being submissive to my husband to the sacrifice
of myself, I suppose. I tried in every way to please him, in my
cooking, staying at home, not working, having the children when he
wanted than, having the number of children he wanted (Tr. 15,16)."
Elizabeth wanted to wait at least a little while after the
marriage to begin having children, but gave in to David's wishes and
started

having

children

right

after

the

marriage

(Tr. 16).

Similarly, because David wanted her to stay in the home, and not to
take a

job, she did not pursue a career (Tr. 16). Before the

separation, her only work outside the home was in a preschool, where
she worked only a few hours a week for about a year. This was before
the parties moved to Salt Lake City (Tr. 46).
Elizabeth obtained an undergraduate degree in business and 44
hours of seminary credit before the marriage. After the marriage,
she did not complete her education. David, on the other hand, went
on to complete the four and one-half years of his seminary training.
During the last year, he was a full-time student and the parties
lived off their savings in the Ready Asset Account (Tr. 54).
After moving to Salt Lake City, in August, 1985, David and
Elizabeth
David's

started
parents

contributed

a mission church
contributed

$350.00

toward

in their home. Each month,

$150.00
the

and

combined

Elizabeth's
church

and

parents
household

expenses (Tr. 52). (The mission church was not a success, and had
closed some time before Elizabeth filed for divorce.)
Shortly after moving to Salt Lake City, David got a job
-4-

driving buses for the Granite School District. This is a suntner job
only:

9-months a year, 6 hours a day, 5 days a week. He also got a

position as a part-time chaplain at the Utah State Prison. There is
no indication that he ever attempted to obtain a full-time job as a
bus driver, as

a minister, or anything else.

After the separation, Elizabeth held two jobs, temporarily. At
the time of the trial she was unemployed. Before the final hearing,
she had obtained a job as a full-time receptionist for a law firm.
At the time of the trial, David was 36 years old, Elizabeth
was 28 years old, and their children were 3, 4, and 6 years old.
David had apparently never contemplated a divorce, as he has
religious convictions forbidding the same (Tr. 781).
B. Education of the Parties Elizabeth: She earned an undergraduate degree in business and
44 hours of seminary credit before the marriage.
David:

He has an undergraduate degree in business and a

Master of Divinity degree from Southwestern Theological Seminary
(Tr.

53). David

spent a total of 7.5 years preparing for the

ministry (Tr. 709).
C. Employment History and Income Potential.
Elizabeth: She did not work outside the home because David
insisted that she be a full-time housewife. Her only employment
outside the home before the separation was as a part-time preschool
teacher in San Antonio, Texas, where she worked about 10 hours a
week for approximately a year (Tr. 46).
-5-

After the separation, Elizabeth worked first in telephone
sales for a few months and afterwards in retail sales for $4.10 an
hour on a part-time basis (Tr. 47, 48). At the time of the trial,
Elizabeth testified that she anticipated

that with her present

office skills she could earn $800.00 to $1,000.00 a month, working
full time (Tr. 50). This prediction proved correct. At the time of
the final hearing, she was employed as a receptionist for a law
firm,

earning $6.00 an hour, or
David:

$960.00 a month, (R. 141).

David was still employed as a part-time bus driver and

chaplain at the time of trial. As a bus driver, David works only 6
hours a day (6:30-9:00 a.m., 2:00-5:00 p.m.), 5 days a week or 30
hours a

week.

He works at this job only 9 months a year (Tr. 733).

He is paid on a 12 month contract, even though he works only 9
months a year (Tr. 697). His income from this job prorated over 12
months, is $860.00 a month, gross. When calculated on a 9-month
basis, it is $1,146.67 a month.
David testified that every two weeks he is paid for 39 hours
of

service as a chaplain at the Utah State Prison. He is not

required to maintain any particular schedule. It is not necessary
for him to provide Sunday services to the inmates. He doesn't have
to work 39 hours.

He can use other ministers or volunteers to fill

in his hours. His income from this employment, which is year-round,
is $700.00 a month (Tr. 614). The income earned at the Prison is tax
exempt, as income earned by clergy (Tr. 728).
In addition, he receives $166.00 a month as a director's fee
-6-

froti his father's business (Tr. 614). There is no evidence that he
has to do any work for this money.
During the summers, David works only at the Prison, vrfiere his
commitment, whether in his own time or that of volunteers, is only
19.5 hours a week.
David advised the trial court that he could earn an extra
$2,000.00 each summer (Tr. 863, R. 132-133). He also testified that
he could apply for additional bus-driving work, up to 10 hours more
a week during the school year (Tr. 732).
The trial court observed, after hearing all of the evidence
and the final arguments of the parties, that it was imperative for
both of the parties to seek additional employment (at that time
Elizabeth did not have a job) (Tr. 850). He ordered the parties to
inform him of any change in their employment status (Tr. 851). In
response to that order, Elizabeth subsequently informed the court
that she had obtained a full-time job and was earning $960.00 a
month. (R. 141).
At a hearing scheduled to discuss the proposed Findings of
Fact, when David's trial attorney protested the award of alimony,
the trial court stated that "he [David] ought to go out and get a
job" (Tr. 868). And again, "He [David] says he has all that time to
spend with the kids. He better take that time and go work somewhere
else" (Tr. 869).
D. Income and Expenses*
Elizabeth: As of the final hearing, Elizabeth's income was
-7-

$960.00 a month. This was the income considered by the trial court
in determining alimony and child support (R. 141).
Elizabeth testified that her current expenses, for herself and
the children, were about $2,100.00 a month (Tr. 63). She had new
expenses, for which the parties had had no obligation before their
separation.
For example, after the separation, the children began going
full-time to a Montessori School, which costs $450.00 a month (Tr.
43, 689). David agrees that the children should attend this school
(Tr* 689). After the separation, Elizabeth had to buy the children's
clothes, whereas previously the paternal grandparents had born most
of this expense

(Tr. 373). In addition, after the separation,

Elizabeth had expenses for maintaining the house and yard, for work
that David used to do.

David testified that when the parties lived

together he did all of the household repairs and yard work (Tr. 706,
707). David insisted that Elizabeth's expenses for maintaining the
house and yard would be equal to the house payment (Tr. 844).
The trial court limited Elizabeth's evidence on her expenses,
stating that he had plenty of information on the living expenses and
income of the parties to enter orders on child support and alimony
(Tr. 738).
David: David has other income, in addition to his income
earned as a part-time bus driver and part-time employee of the
Prison. As mentioned above, he is given a director's fee each year
by

his

father's

business. He continues to receive
-8-

substantial

financial assistance from his parents*
This became evident during the trial* David spent at least
$3,525.00 on costs alone —

in addition to his attorney's fees of at

least $11/303.50 (R. 170-174). He even had sufficient funds to pay
the expenses of out-of-town witnesses, including Kurt Eshelman's
hotel rocm (Tr. 277), and

Pat Lynch1s

airfare, rental-car charges,

and hotel room (Tr. 341-342).
David's trial attorney informed the trial court that David
could cone up with $5,000.00 or more, whatever the court thought was
fair, to buy out Elizabeth's share of the Blazer (Tr. 829). And, as
a

matter of fact, after the trial David took the Blazer from

Elizabeth and gave her a check for $6,500.00 (R. 336).
David seemed to have plenty of money available before the
trial. He testified that he had been paying:
(a) The house payment
(b) Child support
(c) Hot lunches for the children
at their school
(c) Tithing
(d) His own living expenses

$354.00
300.00
60.00
141.00
1,060.00

TOTAL: $1,855.00
(Tr. 619, 620, 759).
David testified that he had borrowed money from his father to
meet expenses (Tr. 762). But the court sustained an objection to the
question as to whether he had borrowed $22,000.00 that year (Tr.
762, 763). There is no evidence that David felt obliged to repay his
father. His financial declaration does not list any loans from his
father (Ex. 18-D).
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David's father testified that during the marriage he had sent
money to the parties on a regular basis but didn't know what they
did with it (Tr. 380). His mother testified that they sent $300.00
at least once or twice a year for the children's clothes, before the
separation. Neither of these witnesses testified that they expected
repayment of any sum of money paid to the parties or to David alone.
Although

David

testified

$1,201.00 (including tithing) —
—

that

his

living

expenses

were

which he believed to be reasonable

he insisted that the living expenses for the entire family before

the separation were between $1,000.00 and $1,200.00 a month. (Tr.
620, 642).
E. Cash Assets *
David's Pre-Marital Holdings: It is undisputed that before the
parties married, David had $37,500.00 in a Merrill Lynch Ready Asset
Account. He had received this fund as a gift from his family.
Cash wedding gift: The parties received a check for $8,000.00
from David's parents as a wedding gift. David testified, "My father
gave us a substantial cash gift.... He gave us an option of a car or
$8,000.00

and we chose the $8,000.00 because I was buying a car

from Liz's father (Tr. 755)." The parties agreed to use $5,000.00
from the $8,000.00 check for tithing (Tr. 761). David explained that
this was a tithe of about 10 percent not only on the wedding gift,
but also on the money he had in the Ready Asset Account and also on
income that he had earned (Tr. 763). The remaining $3,000.00 went
into the Ready Asset Account (Tr. 762).
-10-

Withdrawals from the account: During the marriage/ the parties
used funds from the Ready Asset Account for marital purposes: To set
up a retirenent account/ and to pay living expenses.
David testified that $10,000.00 was taken from the account for
use as IRA payments (Tr. 742). David's intention as to create a
retirenent account and to gain a tax advantage (Tr. 632, 727). The
IRA account was the only retirement account opened during the
marriage except for a small account with Granite School District of
less than $200.00, which was awarded to David (Tr. 618, 742).
Elizabeth testified

that David never made enough money to

support the family without assistance from his parents (Tr. 53) and
that they lived off the Ready Asset Account while he finished the
last year of his education (Tr. 54).
Of the $40,500.00 balance in the Ready Asset Account as of the
date of the marriage, less than $2,000.00 remained at the time of
trial.

Since only $10,000.00 had been used for IRA payments, it is

clear that the parties used over $28,500.00 from this account for
living expenses during their marriage. This helps to explain why
David did not feel it necessary to seek better employment (Tr. 59).
Determination of value to be divided: The trial court ordered
David to provide supplemental information to determine the value of
the accounts as of the date of trial. That information was produced
and filed with the court below, showing the value of the Ready Asset
Account to have been $2,043.92 and that of the IRA Account to have
been $17,905.12 (R. 339-342).
-11-

F. The Marital ResidenceElizabeth and David purchased their marital residence in
December, 1985. Title was always held in the names of both parties.
The parties used a gift of $20,000.00 from David's parents to buy
this house. In addition, David obtained

a no-interest

loan of

$7,000.00 from his parents to use toward the down-payment. The
balance due on the house was financed and the parties made payments
thereon with marital funds.
Elizabeth testified that it had always been her understanding
that the gift was to the entire family (Tr. 769). At the time of the
gift, the parties had been married for over four years, all three of
their children had been born, and no divorce or separation was
pending.
David testified that the gift had been intended as a living
inheritance to him, to help avoid inheritance taxes. But David also
testified that the $20,000.00 was a gift. (Tr. 712, 713). David
acknowledged problems in characterizing his parents' contribution
He told the court, "I'd just as soon the court decide. I have

—

just have to assume that it's your decision, how much the marital
property was in the home for a couple years and how much would be
marital property. I would leave that to your discretion (Tr. 712)."
No documentation for either of his parents' contributions was
produced by David. There is no evidence that the loan is secured.
There is no evidence of a lien or mortgage or note for the loan.
There is no evidence of any writing binding the parties to any
-12-

obligation.

There is no writing setting forth the terms of the

loan*
It is of considerable interest that although both of David's
parents, residents of Palm City, Florida, came to the trial and
testified in his behalf, neither of then had a single word to say
about any gift or loan ever made by then to David and Elizabeth
during their marriage.
It is obvious that Elizabeth contributed to the maintenance
and upkeep of the house through her efforts as housewife and mother
of the parties' children.
G. The Blazer.
In

1987

the

parties

purchased

a

Blazer

automobile

for

$21,166.29 (Tr. 626). The parties traded in their 1982 Buick Regal
station wagon for

$3,635.36 as part of the down-payment. This

vehicle had been given to the parties after the birth of their third
child (Tr. 626). An additional $500.00 was appplied toward the down
payment with funds from the parties' checking account (Tr. 628). In
addition, $13,500.00 received from David's parents was used toward
purchase of the Blazer. The remaining balance was financed, with
payments of $99.00 a month, which were assumed by the plaintiff
after the separation (R. 85).
Elizabeth testified that she thought the vehicle was being
purchased for her and the children, because David had his truck. She
testified that David told her that his father wanted to buy the
parties a car or to give then money to buy a car. She selected the
-13-

car, taking the children's needs into account, and making her
decision largely on that basis (Tr. 769).
David's trial attorney, in the course of arguing that David
should be awarded the Blazer, stated that David would and could pay
Elizabeth $5,000.00 or more for her interest in the Blazer, whatever
amount the trial court thought was fair (Tr. 829).
After the trial, on May 12, 1989, David took the Blazer from
Elizabeth without her permission and gave her a check for $6,500.00
(Re 336). The Notice to Stay Proceedings was not filed until May 31,
1989 (R. 3 2 9 - 3 3 0 ) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING THE PLAINTIFF HALF CF THE MARITAL ESTATE
The trial court found that all of the property held by the
parties at the time of the marriage was marital property and awarded
each

party approximately half of the marital estate (R.255-259).

This was fair and equitable, taking into account all of the facts of
the case and the circumstances of the parties.
Elizabeth was awarded custody of the parties1 three young
children.

She

and

the children obviously

need decent housing,

transportation, and a modicum of fiancial security. In recognition
of these needs, the court awarded Elizabeth the house, subject to a
lien for half of the equity in favor of David. The court awarded the
family car to David, but ordered him to pay Elizabeth $6,500.00 for
use toward the purchase of a car. Elizabeth was also awarded half of
-14-

the family savings and retirement accounts.
In this manner, the judge sought to implorient the proper
purpose of property division by the trial courts To meet the needs
of the parties and to allow them to pursue their separate lives.
Noble v. Noble/ 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah App. 1989).
Further/ the property was fairly divided between the parties,
given their contributions during the marriage. Elizabeth, as a
full-time housewife and the mother of three children born during the
marriage/ clearly participated in the joint economic efforts of the
family.

Preston vs. Preston,

The

trial

judge

646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982).

exercised

his

discretion

well

within

applicable standards. The Decree of Divorce was fashioned to meet
the particular needs and circumstances of Elizabeth and David and
their children. As Justice Zimmerman expressed it, "The overriding
consideration is that the ultimate decision be equitable —
property

be

fairly

divided

between

the

parties

given

that
their

contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the
time of the divorce." Newmeyer v. Newneyer, 747 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Utah 1987). As expressed by Justice Zinmerman in his concurring
opinion in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 1988),
the general principles of equitable distribution remain unchanged by
recent guidelines pertaining to the award of inherited and gifted
property upon divorce.
Appellant claims that the "law in Utah is now clear that
pre-marital property and/or its proceeds should be awarded to the
-15-

party who brought the property into the marriage, citing Preston vs.
Preston, 646 P„2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 Pc2d
44 (Utah 1981); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974); and
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d

326

(Utah 1980).

(Appellant's

Brief, 22c) On this premise, appellant argues that the court ignored
the law in dividing the property and "incorrectly analyzed the
parties1 economic situation and concluded that since the parties had
acquired very little by way of marital assets, the best thing to do
was

to

divide

David's

separate, pre-marital, gifted,

property

equally" (Appelllant's Brief, 24).
The appellant's argument fails on two counts: (1) the property
in question was marital property, and (2) the trial judge did not
ignore the law or otherwise abuse his discretion.
First, before awarding the property to the parties, the trial
judge had found, as a matter of fact, that all of the property owned
by the parties at the time of their divorce was marital property
not separate, pre-marital

and gifted

property

(R. 255-259).

—

The

trial court's findings of fact on this critical point cannot so
lightly be ignored or set aside. This Court should not be asked to
substitute its judgment on factual issues for that of the trial
judge, who had an opportunity to listen to the witnesses, to observe
their demeanor, and to consider the testimony and the arguments of
the parties over a period of several months.
The trial court's findings of fact should not be overturned
absent a demonstration by the appellant that the evidence supporting
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The trial court's findings of fact should not be overturned
absent a demonstration by the appellant that the evidence supporting
the

trial

court's

findings

"is

so lacking as to warrant the

conclusion that clear error has been committed" Newmeyer, supra, at
1278-1279. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous/ and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

52(a). The appellant has not met this burden.
In his discussion of

Mortensen, supra, the appellant appears

to be masking an argument of fact as an argument of law. He cites
Mortensen only for the general principle that "in general the real
and personal property brought into a marriage or inherited during a
marriage should be awarded to the donee upon divorce (Appellant's
Brief, 22). He does not discuss the exceptions to this general
guideline, as delineated by Justice Howe, and he does not discuss
the very useful concurring opinion of Justice Zinmerman, including
this statement:
The overarching general rule remains
the same in any divorce case: to provide
adequate support for the children of the
marriage [citation], and to divide the economic
assets and income stream of the parties so as to
permit both to maintain themselves after the
marriage as nearly as possible at the standard
of
living
enjoyed
during
the
marriage.
[Citation.] Id., at 310.
In Mortensen,
Humphrey,

and

Justice

Jesperson

Howe

relies

on

, supra, holding

Preston, Georgedes,
that

pre-marital

inherited property had been or should be awarded to the person
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or
who

brought it into the marriage.

These cases, cited by the appellant

in support of his position, are in fact distinguishable on the facts
from the case under consideration.
For example, all of these cases involve second marriages, into
which

the

parties

divorces.

had

brought

property

salvaged

from

earlier

More important, in not one of these cases had any

children been born as issue of the parties. Only the interests of
adults

were

at

stake.

In

Preston,

Georgedes,

and

Humphrey,

substantial assets were available for distribution at the time of
the

divorce,

and,

generally

speaking,

the

overall

financial

situation of the parties was far superior to tthat of David and
Elizabeth. In Jesperson, the parties were 68 and 73 years old at the
time of the divorce. They had been married only a few years, and the
only property in dispute was a mobile home which had belonged to the
wife before the marriage, the award of which to the wife was upheld
on appeal.
Finally, in not one of these cases had the trial court found
—* as it did in the divorce of David and Elizabeth —

that the

property in dispute was all marital property.
In the case now under appeal, even if the trial judge had not
found all of the property to be part of the marital estate, the
award to Elizabeth could withstand attack. As discussed in Peterson
v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, Section 30-3-5(1) of the Utah Cede Ann.
is construed to mean that not only may the parties1 pre-marital
property be subject to division by the court, but also, in making
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the division of property, the court can take into account all of the
circumstances of the parties, including the funds available for
support of the family. In this case, those funds are limited*
The

record

is very clear that the trial judge carefully

considered all of the facts and arguments concerning the parties1
property. David's arguments concerning the property were submitted
to the trial court not only during the course of the trial, at final
argument,

and

during

argument on defendant's objections to the

proposed Findings of Fact, but also in correspondence and in a
lengthy

memorandum

filed

with

the

court

after

the

trial

(R.

149-160).
POINT II
DAVID SBOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CLAIM ANY ADDITIONAL AWARD
FOR HIS PARENTS1 GIFT FOR THE BLAZER BECAUSE HE HAS TAKEN
SAID VEHICLE FROM ELIZABEIH, AGAINST HER WILL AND CCMBRARY
TO THE STAY OF EXECUTION, AND HAS PAID HER $6,500.00 FOR
SAID VEHICLE, AS ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT
David

now

claims

that

he

is

entitled

to

an

additional

$13,500.00 from the marital estate because of his parents1 gift for
the purchase of an automobile.
During the trial, David expressed his willingness to pay
Elizabeth

whatever the court thought was fair for her interest in

the Blazer (Tr. 829). The trial court awarded David the Blazer and
ordered him to pay Elizabeth $6/500.00. This order was stayed upon
notice of this appeal (R. 329-330). Nevertheless, David took the
Blazer from Elizabeth, without her permission, and gave her a check
for $6,500.00. The judgment has been satisfied (R. 338). Having thus
-19-

elected to benefit himself in this manner, David should not be
allowed to object to the trial court's ruling on the Blazerc
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INCLUDING SPECIFIC GIFTS MADE
BY THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTS AS PART OF THE MARTEVL ESTATE
A.

The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Awarding
Plaintiff $6,500.00 for Her Interest in the Blazer and to Assist
Her in Buying a^ New Car.
The trial court awarded the Blazer to David and ordered him to

pay $6,500.00 to Elizabeth, as her share of the equity in the Blazer
and to assist her in buying a new car.
The

parties

received

$13,500.00

as

a

gift

from

parents, for a down-payment on a family automobile.

David's

Elizabeth

testified that the Blazer was purchased primarily for her use and
the children.

David had told her that his father wanted to buy the

parties a car or to give then money to buy a car (Tr. 769).
The Blazer was purchased for $21,166.29. The parties traded in
their 1982 Buick Regal station wagon for $3,635.36 as part of the
down-payment. The parties used $500.00 from their checking account
toward the down-payment (Tr. 626-628). The balance was financed. The
parties made payments of $99.00 a month from marital income. After
the separation, Elizabeth

continued to have the use of the Blazer

and made the payments on it (R. 85).
At trial, David insisted that he should be awarded the Blazer.
However, he acknowledged that Elizabeth was entitled to half of the
equity.
court

He offered to pay her $5,000.00 or whatever larger sum the

might

order

for

that

interest
-20-

(Tr.

829). Later,

in

a

memorandum filed before the judge issued his Memorandum Decision,
David urged the court to award the Blazer to him, stating that he
would pay Elizabeth whatever sum the court decided would be just, so
that Elizabeth could purchase a replacement vehicle (R. 159)e In
thus seeking to persuade the court to award the Blazer to him —
which he was successful —

in

David did not ask for any consideration

for his parents' contribution toward purchase of this vehicle.
This acknowledgment was appropriate. The Blazer was a marital
asset. The gift used toward its purchase had been commingled with
other marital property
contributions

toward

(Tr. 626, 628). The Blazer (and thus all
its

purchase)

had

depreciated

in value.

Therefore, David should not be credited with the value of the gift
or any percentage thereof. Mortenson, supra, at 308.
B. The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Equally Dividing
the Equity in the Marital Residence:
The parties stipulated that whoever was awarded custody of the
children should be given the use of the house. Elizabeth was awarded
custody of the children. The house was awarded to her, subject to a
lien in favor of David for half of the equity.
Elizabeth testified that David's parents gave $20,000.00 to
both parties, so that they could buy a home (Tr. 769). David stated
that the gift was to him alone (Tr. 712,713). David's parents,
though called to testify, said nothing about the gift.
David

acknowledged

Elizabeth's full ownership

in the

house by allowing or directing that her name be on the title
thereto. Title to the house is in the names of both parties. If,
-21-

arguendo, the

$20,000.00 gift had been made only to David, by

placing her name on the deed he gave her an interest in the
property, thus bringing this issue with the exceptions set forth in
Mortensen, supra, at 308. Even if Elizabeth's name had not been on
the title, she would have acquired an equitable interest, by virtue
of her contribution to its maintenance and upkeep.
During the trial, David indicated to the court that he would
accept the court's decision as to the extent that the house equity
was treated as marital property (Tr. 712).
After the trial, in a long memorandum filed on his behalf,
David

urged

that

the

house

be

awarded

to

him

(R.

157). He

acknowledged that the parties had few assets and that this had a
bearing on how the property was to be divided (R. 157). He stated
that if the house was awarded to Elizabeth, she should be ordered to
assume the mortgage and to pay off the $7,000.00 alleged loan to his
parents, and that he should be awarded a lien "in a reasonable
amount to be determined by the court11 (R. 158). David argued that
Elizabeth should be allowed to stay in the house for two or three
years, "subject to her assuming the mortgage and upkeep of he home,"
after which the house should be sold and "the equity divided" (R.
158). In a letter mailed to the court after the trial, David urged
that the house be awarded to him and that Elizabeth should be
awarded a lien of $10,000,00, which he would pay within five years
(R. 132-133).
Concerning the $7,000.00 received from David's parents, the
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Findings of Fact adopted by the trial court state, in pertinent
parts
30
In addition, the defendant's parents loaned $7,000.00 , with no
interest and with no required payments thereon,
to the defendant to assist in puchasing this
property. This loan is not secured and is not
evidenced in writing and is not enforceable
against the parties (R. 256).
This is consistent with the testimony of the parties. Davidfs
parents did not testify on this issue. There is no evidence of any
agreement for repayment with Elizabeth. There is no evidence that
she ever agreed to answer for David's obligation, which, in any
event, could not be binding on her now, absent a writing subscribed
by the plaintiff. Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-4 (2), Utah Code
Ann. There was no abuse of discretion is awarding the house to
Elizabeth without a requirement that she pay Davidfs loan to his
parents.
David's parents have no ownership interest in the house. At
the most, they are creditors. The determination of their rights was
not at issue before the court, and imposed no limitations on the
discretion of the trial judge in making his award. In Smith v.
Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah

App. 1988), the wife was awarded a car,

a mobile home, and other assets which had been purchased by the
husband's parents, or for which his parents had loaned the parties
money, with a promise to repay. On appeal it was held that the
interests of the husband's parents were those of creditors only, and
that there was no abuse of discretion in the award. ^Id., at 1151.
-23-

POINT IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION CR OTHERWISE ERR IN NOT
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT HIS ALLEGED REMNANT OF PREMWOTAL PROPERTY
Ac The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion, as the Partiesf
Pre-Marital and Marital Assets Have Been OariTiingled.
This court has held that the trial court's findings will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous or it is clear that a
mistake has been made. Johnson v. Johnson/ 103 Utah Adv. Rep 22, 23
(Utah App. 1989). The trial court adopted a number of specific
findings concerning those assets of the parties in which David's
pre-marital estate had been commingled. The proposed Findings of
Fact

were

subjected

to

rigorous

review

upon

hearing

of

the

defendant's objections/ in support of which he had filed a 27-page
memorandum (R. 194-224). After this hearing, the court adopted the
proposed Findings of Fact, as amended pursuant to order of the
court, including the following:
29. The marital estate consists of the
following:
(f) Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account
#56623210, the balance of which, according to
the
defendant's
Financial
Declaration was
$1,944.59 on September 7, 1989, and the present
value of which is unknown;
(g)
Merrill
Lynch
I.R.A.
Account
#566-46206, the balance of which, according to
the defendant's Financial Declaration, was
$13,945.00 on January 1, 1989, and the present
value of which is unknown; (R. 255, 256)
37. Shortly before the parties' marriage,
the defendant sold real property which he had
previously received as a gift from his parents
and deposited the proceeds of sale, $37,000.00,
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in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account. (R.
257)
38. The parties received a wedding gift
from the defendant's parents in the amount of
$8,000.00. From this sum, tithing was paid in
the amount of $5,000.00 for gifts received frcm
defendant's parents (including that referred to
in the preceding paragraph), and deposited the
remainder in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset
Account. As described in this paragraph, the
gift of $37,500.00 and the wedding gift of
$8,000.00 were commingled. (R. 11)
39. The parties used funds from said
account to meet their living expenses. In
addition, $10,000.00 was withdrawn from said
account and deposited in a Merrill Lynch I.R.A.
account, the parties' only retirement account.
(R. 12)
40. In order to determine the value of the
Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account and the
Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account as of the date the
Decree of Divorce is entered, it will be
necessary
for
the defendant
to produce
documentary verification of said values as of
the date of entry. Said documentation should be
provided to counsel for the plaintiff within 30
days of the date of entry of the Decree. (R.
258)
41. The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account
and the Merrill Lynch I.R.A. accounts are both
marital assets and it is reasonable, just and
equitable that their value should be divided
equally between the parties. The defendant
should be awarded both of these accounts and he
should be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as her
share of said accounts, half of the value of
said accounts as shown on the books of Merrill
Lynch as of the date of entry of the Decree of
Divorce, for which sum the plaintiff should be
given judgment. (R. 258)
These Findings of Fact are amply supported by the record.
Frcm the very beginning of their marriage, the parties commingled
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their

marital

assets

and

their

pre-marital

assets. David

had

$37,500.00 in a Ready Asset Account before the marriage. The parties
received a cash gift of $8,000.00 as a wedding gift (Tr. 755). They
did not open a special account for this gift. Instead, they agreed
to take $5,000.00 from the gift to pay a a tithe on both the Ready
Asset Account and the gift (Tr. 761, 763). In this manner, the
parties demonstrated that they made no distinction between the money
in the Ready Asset Account and the money they received as a wedding
gift.

Because

the

funds

have

been

commingled,

the

so-called

Mortensen rule invoked by the appellant does not apply.
If it had been David's intent to keep his pre-marital funds
separate, he would have opened a new account for the wedding gift,
and he would not have depleted that gift by using it to pay his
personal tithing obligations.
In Mortensen, Justice Howe concluded that trial courts should
generally give to a divorcing spouse the gift or inheritance he or
she acquired during the marriage unless "(1) the other spouse has by
his or her efforts or expense contributed

to the enhancement,

maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby

acquiring an

equitable interest in it, [citation], or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through conmingling or exchanges or
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of therein to the other
spouse, ^d, at 308.
Throughout their marriage, the parties continued to use the
Ready Asset Account as a family resource. During David's last year
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of study at the theological seminary, he chose not to hold down a
job and the parties lived off this account (Tr. 54). During their
marriage they continued to draw on the account to meet their living
expenses. It is estimated that they used approximately $28,500.00
from the fund for such expenses.
In addition, the account was used for the family purpose of
establishing a retirement account. David testified that he withdrew
about $10,000.00 from the Ready Asset Account to make IRA payments
(Tr. 742). He testified that this was the parties1 only retirement
account (Tr. 618). He clearly intended to change the character of
the funds withdrawn from the Ready Asset Account. Otherwise he would
not have made the transfers. In addition, it is clear that the
transfers were made to achieve a tax advantage for the family,
resulting in increased cash-flow for the use of the parties (Tr.
632, 727).
The fact that IRA account is in David's name only does not
establish that Elizabeth has no claim to a share of it. To the
contrary, the presumption arises that the account was opened to
benefit both parties. This is especially so because David does not
believe in divorce and there is no evidence to suggest that he ever
anticipated

that

Elizabeth

would

leave

him.

Therefore,

it

is

reasonable to assume that the IRA account was set up to provide
support

for

both

parties

after

David's

retirement.

This

consistent with David's conservative definition of family values.
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is

B. The Trial Court's Award to Elizabeth of Half the Value of the
Ready Asset and the IRA Account Is Equitable Even Without a
Finding that Funds Had Been Commingled.
The trial court awarded David both of these accounts and gave
Elizabeth judgment for half of their value as of the date of the
divorcee The judgment amount is $9,997.52. (This is significantly
less

than

David's

$13,900.00

lien

on

the

house, which opens

possibilities for satisfying the judgment.)
Even without a finding that the funds had been cotmiingled, on
the basis of all of the facts of this case, including the origin and
use of the Ready Asset and IRA Accounts, the cash contributions of
both

sets

Elizabeth's

of

the

limited

parties'

parents,

employment

David's

prospects,

underemployment,

the

needs

of

the

children, and the limited resources of the parties, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by awarding Elizabeth judgment for half
of the value of the Ready Asset and IRA Accounts.
The trial record clearly establishes that this was not the
usual case in which the Mortensen guidelines could be rigorously
applied without consideration of all of the circumstances. David had
never supported his family without help from his parents (Tr. 52,
380, 762). At an earlier time, the parties also received assistance
from Elizabeth's parents

(Tr. 52). Even so, David has elected to

wDrk only part time. During the summer he works, at most, only 19.5
hours a week (R. 614). As a result of David's election not to make
an adequate living for the family, he has limited the assets of the
parties.
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C. Elizabeth is Entitled to Half of the IRA Account as Her Share of
the Parties' Retirement Fund.
In a chain of cases, beginning with Wbodward v. Woodward, 656
Po2d. 431 (Utah 1982), the courts of this state have established
that the interest in a retiranent plan accrued during marriage is a
marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. In a
very recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the
general rule that whenever possible distribution of this asset
should be made at the time of the divorce and should be deferred
only in rare instances. Motes v. Motes, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah
App. 1989).
Utah law does not provide an exception for privately funded
retiranent plans. The IRA Account is subject to division as the
parties'

retirement

plan.

Utah

law requires that Elizabeth be

awarded half of the assets accumulated in the retiranent account
during the marriage. The Decree of Divorce makes such an award,
giving Elizabeth judgment for half of the value of the retiranent
account as of the date of the divorce. This judgment is consistent
with the rule that distribution not be deferred.
It would be inequitable and contrary to Utah law to deny such
an award to Elizabeth. The IRA payments were reported as if they
were

paid

from

current

earnings. As money

income, to

defer

taxation

on

current

is fungible, it should be considered of no

consequence that the parties1 savings were depleted to set up their
retiranent account. This only freed up their current income for
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ordinary household expenses.
In any event/ the parties used marital funds to set up the IRA
account. Funds for this purpose were taken from the Ready Asset
Account/ in which David's pre-marital funds and those of the parties
had been commingled (Tr. 742/ 755-762). The Ready Asset Account was
constantly used as a marital resource. The purchase of the parties'
retirement account with funds withdrawn from it is just another
example of this use.
POINT V
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION OR
OTHERWISE ERR IN MAKING HIS AWARD OF ALIMONY
Elizabeth was awarded $250.00 a month alimony. The appellant
claims that this order is not supported by the law or the evidence,
and should be reversed and vacated. The appellant argues (1) that
the trial court erred by failing to equalize the parties1 standard
of living, and (2) that the Findings of Fact are inadequate.
In fact,

the formal Findings of Fact are sufficiently detailed

to support the alimony order. Those pertaining to alimony are as
follows:
16. The defendant is employed as a bus driver
for Granite School District and as a part-time
chaplain for the Utah State Prison. The
defendant receives an annual director's fee of
$2,000.00 from Wilson Land Development Co., a
business founded by his father. His gross income
frcm these three sources is $1,747.00 (R. 253).
17. The plaintiff was not employed outside
the home during the marriage. The plaintiff was
not employed outside the home at the time of the
divorce [trial]. She obtained employment as a
receptionist prior to the ruling entered herein.
She is now earning $960.00 a month, gross (R.
253).
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26. Based on the standard of living enjoyed
by the parties during their marriage, the
incomes of the parties, the needs of the
plaintiff, and the defendant's ability to pay,
it is reasonable, just, and equitable that the
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in
the amount of $250.00 a month. Said alimony
shall terminate upon the plaintiff's remarriage,
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex,
or death (R. 254, 25).
The appellant claims that these findings are insufficient
because they do not mention Elizabeth's ability to provide for
herself,

and

because

they

do not include the parties' living

expenses. Neither charge is correct. Finding 17 concerns Elizabeth's
employment record and states the terms of her present employment.
Finding 26 addresses all of the necessary elements, including the
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. In
any event, it is not necessary for a trial court's written findings
to set forth all factors, but only those which it considers to be
most pertinent. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App.
1989).
Further, the findings of the court are not limited to the
formal

Findings of Fact. They may also be set forth in oral

statements of the court. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 856 (Utah
App. 1989). In the case now on appeal, the trial judge stated that
he had plenty of information on living expenses of the parties and
their incomes (Tr. 738). The court stated that there was not enough
money to go around and that it was imperative for both of the
parties to seek additional employment (Tr. 850). At that point in
the proceedings, Elizabeth was not employed. Responding to the
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directive of the trial court she got a job (before the alimony was
awarded) (R, 141. David did nothing to improve his situation*
Taken together, the formal Findings of Fact and the statements
made by the trial

judge during the proceedings are more than

sufficient to meet the standard established in this jurisdiction.
That is, the findings must (1) include enough facts to disclose the
process

through

which

the ultimate conclusion is reached,

(2)

indicate the process is logical and properly supported, and (3) be
not clearly erroneous. Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202-203
(Utah App. 1987).
After the trial, David's lawyer filed a 27-page Request for
Clarification of Minute Entry, Objections to Proposed Findings,
Conclusions

and

194-224).

A

including

those

Decree,

and Motion to Reconsider Judgment

(R.

hearing was had on these motions and objections,
pertaining

204-205, 215-218).

to

the

It was charged

alimony

award

(R. 199-200,

that the alimony

award gave

Elizabeth an unfair share of the parties1 combined income, that
David

would not have enough money

left over to meet his own

expenses, and that Elizabeth wasn't entitled to alimony because of
the term of the marriage and her college education. The written
objections and motions before the court at that hearing contained
detailed itemizations of expenses, income, and the net effect of the
trial court's alimony order, taken together with the orders for
child support and day-care expenses (R. 204-205, 215-216).
During the

post-trial hearing of David's objections and
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motions, he protested the $250.00 alimony award, claiming his client
couldn't afford to pay it. In response, the trial court stated, "he
[David] ought to go out and get a job" (Tr. 868). And again, "He
[David] says he has all that time to spend with the kids. He better
take that time and go work somewhere else" (Tr. 869).
Although Elizabeth's revised Financial Declaration was not
formally introduced into evidence, it was in the file and it appears
that the judge was familiar with its contents (Tr. 737, R. 107-110).
Elizabeth

testified

that

her

expenses

were

$2,100.00

a

month

(Tr.63). David attempted to establish that her expenses were much
lower on the basis of his allegations that the expenses for the
entire family, before the separation, had been only $1,100.00 a
month

(Tr. 644, 646). Almost simultaneously he alleged that his

expenses, for himself

alone, not

including

child support, were

$1,501.00 (Tr. 619). His evidence is not credible.
In any event, after the separation Elizabeth had new expenses,
for which no payment was needed before the separation. For example,
David testified that while the parties lived together he did the
household repairs and yard maintenance (Tr. 706-707). David claimed
that without his work on the house, the cost of maintaining it would
be as burdensome as the monthly payment [$354.00] (Tr. 844).
Alimony is to be based on the paying spouse's ability to pay.
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978). The ability to pay is
not defined by the paying spouse's income at time of divorce. In
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah App. 1988), an award
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of alimony was upheld even though payment would require the husband
to liquidate his sole and separate property. In Paffel v. Paffel,,
732 P. 2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court declared that
trial courts could consider a second spouse's income as a source for
payment of alimony to a first spouse. In Mortensen, supra, at 308,
it was held that property awarded to the husband would be considered
as an income source when considering alimony and child support.
David was awarded assets (an equity in the house, a Blazer,
and the Merrill Lynch Accounts), which could be used by him to make
alimony payments. In addition, his parents, who have always assisted
him financially, can assist him in making his alimony payments. This
would be no less proper that receiving assistance through a second
wife, as in Paffel, supra.
(The extent of David's reliance on his parents became very
apparent during the divorce proceedings. In spite of his modest
income, he had funds available to pay for two expert witnesses, to
pay witness' travel and living expenses, to pay his own substantial
living expenses (Tr. 170-174, 277, 341-342, 762). He was able to
come up with $6,500.00 to pay to Elizabeth for the Blazer. In
addition,

some notice must be given to the fact that he had the

resources to mount this appeal, involving not only the services of
an attorney, but also the transcription of 876 pages of transcript.)
As for Elizabeth's ability to earn income, she testified that
except for seme part-time work in a pre-school in 1983-1984, and two
temporary

sales

jobs after the separation, she had not worked
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outside the home (Tr. 46-48). The only evidence about her earning
capacity

is her own testimony that she thought she could earn

between $900.00 and $1,000.00 a month and, later, that in fact she
had secured a job for $960.00 a month (Tr. 960, R. 141). Further, it
is improbable that Elizabeth's potential will ever come close to
David's. The function of the alimony award is to help equalize the
disparity in the parties' incomes, taking into account the disparate
circumstances and opportunities of the parties. The alimony order
and the findings upon which it rests are in conformance with the
guidelines articulated by Justice Durham in Higley v. Higley, 676
P.2d 379 (Utah 1983).
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
It is charged that the trial judge erred in ordering David to
pay

$5,000.00 toward Elizabeth's attorney's fees, alleging that

David does not have the ability to pay these fees. Elizabeth's need
and the reasonableness of her fees are not disputed.
Kerr

v.

Kerr,

610

P.2d

1380

(Utah 1980),

cited by the

appellant as the foundational case for alimony, requires only that
the award be based on need and reasonableness. Other considerations
rest in the discretion of the court. Appellant refers only to a much
earlier case for the proposition that the trial court must consider
the ability of the other party to pay. Ghost v. Ghost, 26 Utah 2d
398, 490 P.2d 339 (1971). It is not at all clear that Utah law now
requires conclusive proof that the party charged has the ability to
-35-

pay

from

current

income, while not taking

into account other

resources available for payment. It would appear that the test is
who is most able to pay.
The evidence is that David has a far greater ability to pay
Elizabeth's attorney's

fees than she does. His gross income is

almost double hers. As set forth in the Findings of Fact, his income
is $1,747.00; hers was only $960.00 (R.258). Elizabeth is working
full time as a receptionist, in addition to having the primary
responsibility

for

caring

for

the

children,

supervising

their

education, and maintaining the home. David is working as a bus
driver, 6:00-9:00 a.m. and 2:30-5:00 p.m., plus 19.5 hours or less a
week at the Prison, nine months a year (Tr. 697). During the other
three months, he works only at the Prison (Tr. 614). Although he had
a Master of Divinity degree, he seems to be content with his present
employment.
The

trial

court

directed

both

parties

to

improve

their

employment. By the final hearing, Elizabeth had done so. However,
the defendant gave no indication that he had done anything to
improve

his

situation.

The

evidence

is

clear

that

David

is

under-employed and that he could easily increase his income but
elects not to (Tr. 868). He stated as much (Tr. 863). He admitted
that additional hours were available to him on his bus driving job.
He stated that he could earn additional income if it were necessary
(R. 156). David could earn an extra $2,000.00 during the summer
months (Tr. 863, R. 132-133).
-36-

Nsv'.": ^Ireless, it is clear that the court did not take possible
income into account in making its award of attorney's fees (Tr. 863,
R. 253-254). This becomes clear when it is recognized that Elizabeth
was awarded less than half of her legal expenses. Elizabeth was
awarded only $5,000.00 in attorney's fees, even though the fees and
costs itemized in the first application were $12,095.00 (R. 161-169).
Because her need and the reasonableness of her request were clear,
as now conceded, it must be concluded that the award was reduced on
the basis of David's circumstances.
Further, the court denied a second application for attorney's
fees was filed by Elizabeth's attorney, for services rendered after
trial but

before entry of the Decree of Divorce (R. 338). Once

again, it appears that the trial court took David's circumstances
into account.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
the plaintiff half of the marital property.

awarding

The court properly found that all property belonging to the
parties was marital property and did not abuse his discretion by
evenly dividing this property, under all of the circumstances of
this case, including the fact that the plaintiff made significant
contributions to the joint efforts of the parties as a full-time
housewife and mother of the parties' four small children. Contrary
to appellant's charge, Utah law does not require that all property
brought into the marriage by a spouse be returned to him upon
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divorce, especially as in this case, where it has become ccxttningledc
The gifts received during the marriage from defendant's parents have
been corrtningled and have lost their unique identity. In any event
they were gifts to both parties, and even if they had not been,
equity would require an even division of the modest estate to
protect the interests of the children and to allow the plaintiff to
continue in a standard of living at least similar to that enjoyed
during the marriage.
POINT II: David [defendant] should not be allowed to claim any
additional award for his parents' gift for the Blazer,
because he has taken said vehicle from Elizabeth
[plaintiff], Against her Will and Contrary to the Stay of
Execution, and has paid her $6,5000.00 for said vehicle,
as ordered by the trial court.
Having succeeded in getting the order he wanted on the Blazer,
and having unilaterally proceeded to act on that order, in spite of
the stay of execution filed by his attorney, it would be totally
inequitable and unjust to allow the defendant to ask for a credit
for his parents' gift used to purchase this asset.
POINT III: The trial court did not err in including specific gifts
made by the defendant's parents as part of the marital
estate.
The trial

judge did not abuse his discretion

in awarding

plaintiff $6,500.00 for her interest in the Blazer and to assist her
in buying a new car. The trial J|udge did not abuse his discretion in
equally dividing the equity in the marital residence. The defendant
consented that the court should decide the plaintiff's equity in
these assets. The gifts received from defendant's parents were to
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both parties. The gifts have, in any event, lost their separate
identity. Even if the gifts had been made only to the defendant, in
this divorce, involving three small children, and with a modest
estate and limited resources, in large part due to the fact that the
defendant has continued to work only part-time, equity demands an
even division of the assets.
POINT IV; The trial judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise
err in not awarding the defendant his alleged remnant of
pre-marital property.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion, as the
parties' pre-marital and marital assets were commingled from the
very beginning of the marriage, when the parties used part of their
cash wedding gift to pay the defendant's tithe on his savings and
then deposited the remainder of their wedding money with said
savings. Not only is the plaintiff entitled to a share of the
commingled

savings, but

also

she

is entitled to half of the

retirement account which was created out of the commingled savings
of the parties.
POINT V:

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise
err in making his award of alimony

Contrary to the appellant's
plenty

of

information

concerning

charges, the trial court had
the

plaintiff's

expenses. He

recognized the difficulty of the parties' situation and took all
pertinent factors into consideration. The ability of the defendant
to pay alimony is not limited to his income. It is proper that he
should be expected to look to other resources, if necessary, to pay
-39-

alimony o
POINT VI: The trial court did not err in the award of attorney's
fees
The court took into full account all factors required for
consideration, as indicated by the fact that he awarded plaintiff
less than half of her attorney's fees, which appellant now concedes
were both needed by plaintiff and reasonable.

aaraxjsioN
The relief requested

should be denied, and the Decree of

Divorce should be upheld in its entirety. The trial judge did not
err, as charged, in the distribution of property. Nor did he exceed
his discretion in the awards of alimony and attorney's fees made to
the plaintiff.
As of the time of the divorce, all of the property held by the
parties was marital property, including their house, the Blazer, the
Ready Asset Account, and their retirement account. The property was
divided in approximately equal shares, which was well within the
discretion of the trial court.
During the proceedings below, the defendant acknowledged the
plaintiff's entitlement to a full share of the equity in the house
and the Blazer. He did not at that time claim that he should be
given

a

larger

portion

of

the

state

on

the

basis

of

the

contributions of his parents. The judgment below has been satisfied,
in any event, as to the Blazer.
The

other

assets

of

the

parties
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fall

well

within

the

exceptions

of

Mortensen,

supra. The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset

Account was ccxnmingled with marital property from the moment the
parties deposited $3,000.00 from their wedding gift in this account,
after first using $5,000.00 from their gift to pay David's then
existing tithing obligation. Subsequently, withdrawals from this
marital account were used for the parties•living expenses and to set
up their retirement account.
The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account has been used as, and
is, a marital asset, and was properly divided by the trial court.
The plaintiff is entitled to half of the IRA account, pursuant to
principles

of

equitble

distribution

and

more

specific

rulings

concerning retirement accounts, such as Woodward, supra.
The alimony award is necessary and proper, and should not be
vacated or modified. The plaintiff demonstrated her need for this
award and the trial court was fully aware of David's circumstances
and his ability to pay alimony. David has the ability to pay the
alimony ordered. His ability to pay alimony is properly not to be
determined only on the basis of his present employment. The court
could and did consider the fact that David was underemployed and
directed the defendant to get a better job so that he could meet his
obligations. Also, David has other resources to assist him in
payment of his alimony obligation, including the property awarded to
him and his parents1 bounty.
The award of attorney's fees should not be vacated. The court
awarded the plaintiff less than half of her legal expenses, which,
-41-

the defendant now recognizes to have been reasonable. The defendant
in like matter now concedes that the plaintiff has a need for the
award. The only question before the Court is the defendants ability
to pay. Again, there is nothing in Utah law limiting the defendant's
ability to pay to the use of his current inccxne. It is clear on the
record that the defendant has the ability to pay. For so long as he
thought it was to his advantage (before the Memorandum Decision was
entered), the defendant took every opportunity to advise the trial
judge that he could get extra money to effect the kind of property
distribution he was urging upon the court. He can now exercise those
options to obey the orders of the court as to alimony and attorney's
fees.
Respondent requests that the relief sought by appellant be
denied in every particular, and that she be awarded her attorney's
fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of December, 1989.

JUDITH RQMNEY WOLBACH
Attorney for Plaintiff, Respondent
on the Appeal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on Monday, December 18, 1989, I hand
delivered four correct copies of the Brief of Respondent to
fo record

counsel

for the Appellant, Kent M. Kasting, DART, ADAMSON &

KASTING, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

<^=:V^
J u d i t h Romney Vfolbach
Attorney for Respondent
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ffKVE UPON OPf JNG COUNSEL AT LFiST
FIVE ,51 DAYS BEFORE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.

In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
^.TZARETH ft. WTLSON,

Third Judicial.DiStsict
1
Plaintiff
t-f.non

m
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON

Case No.

D-88-642

REVISED

5(1989

Financial Declaration

sea--* _-

Dated:

12/27/88

Husband:

\
Wife:

Elizabeth A. Wilson

Address:

Address:

5496 Snntih Hews P l a c e
g*u- T^V^ r i t - y . ntah 84118

Soc. Sec. No.:

Soc. Sec. No.

?14-74-%1 ?

Occupation: _.

Occupation:

Homemafrer, rlprV

Employer:

Employer:

Birthdate:

Birthdate:

Fred Meyer
8/25/58

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED
WILL AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALLSUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY
AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME. EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly flfures when income is received and deductions are
made weekly, multiply by 4J; if flfures are on a bi-weekly basis, multiply by 2.167)
I

Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses.
allowances and overtime, payable
period) _ _ _ _ _ ^ _
_

1

HUSBAND

s

WIFE

s
450.00

(pay

I

Pensions and retirement
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payments, etc.)
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
Rents
All other sources: (Specify)

!
1

I
i
!
1
!

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
State and federal income taxes

3
Number ol exemptions taken
Social security
Medical or other insurance (describe fully)

1

1 s

s

s

1s

450.0G

31.56

I

!
i

8.80

i

1

18 .00

|

I

1
1

Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Credit union

1
i

1

A-1

1
-Q-lfi

Other: (specify)

j
$

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS

|S

s

..

Net mom hi v income • take home pav
4

Debts and obligations
Creditor's Name

Date Payable

For

CM7\C

nar

L

Balance

..._

1

Monthly Pavment

99.53

1

s

.

* as of 6/88

(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5.

391.64

5.175.56*

loan

s
TOTAI

58.36

is

All property of the parties lenown to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband. (W) Wife, (J) Jointly)
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE
Value
Owed Thereon

s

(a) Household furnishings, furniture,
appliances, and equipment
(b)

Should be divided as per l i s t s
Miniirai
Automobile (Year-Make) _
attached hereto
I
1987 Chevrolet Rlazpr
1979 Chevrolet pickup truck

(c) Securities - stocks, bonds

Merril Lvnch Readv Asset Acc't #56623210
Church Bond Series
Merrill Lynch IRA Acc't #b66-462Ub

1,994.59
767.35
U,Uby.//

Dpfpndanf! s armnnt (s)

Unknown

P l a - i n - H f f ' g HngHHnrj

Varies

arrnnnf-

Wilson distributing acc't

Cyprus—C.U. Wilson savings acc't
(e) Life Insurance:
Name of Company

(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts
Name
Name

Poltcv No.

•

*•*

*as of 9/7/88
**as of 1/1/88

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings <& loans.
credit unions • savings and checking)

ryprns r . n

•

#6438051

#64^8f)qs
Face Amount

25,Q

?nn.o
Cash value, accumulated
dividend, or loan amount

Value of interest and amount presently vested

,

,—•

(g) Other Personal Propenv and Assets (specifv)

Plaintiff's jewelry, not part of the marital estate, having been receiived as an
inhpni-^nrp, has b^en recently appraised at $2,500.00. After the separation of
t-h<=> pprt-ipg thP r^fpndant made ,a gift of a computer to the plaintiff/ which is
not part of the marital estate.

A-2.

(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional property)

Type of Property

Address 5596 Sn—Hews P l a r p
c ^ l t - T ^ k g Cii-y.

TTT 3411 ft

Original Cost S
55,900.00
Cost of Additions S
;
Total COM $ _ _ .
26.300.00
Mtg Balance S
Other Liens S _
Equity S
r
Monthly Amortization S

Marital

residence

Date of Acquisition
12/85
Total Present Value < 5 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0

Basis of valuation

Tax a p p r a i s a l

?7 nnn.nn

7ax«S

And to whom

630.33

Individual contributions

(0 Business interest (Indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

(j) Other assets (Specify)

6

Total monthly expenses. '(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose
expenses are included.)
HUSBAND
•

Plaint--iff

is

mi.q-r-nHi^l

Rent or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence)
Ma.ntenancelrevdence)
includes

p;3rvant- n-F f-hp 1

354.00
50.QQ
yard

±
.
Work

80.00
350.00
180.00
60.00
5.00
50.00
70.00

Food and household supplies —
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat
Telephone

WIFE

nhilHrvan

;

Laundry and cleaning
Clothing
Medical

Dental
Insurance (lile. health, accident, comprehensive liability,
disability) Exclude Cay roll Deducted

Child care Mhn-hessori

450.00

School

Payment ol child spousal support re prior marriage
School — _ _ _ - _ _ — - _ _ _ - — - _ — — _ — — —
Entertainment (include?* clubs, social obligations, travel recreation).
incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations)
Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Auto payments _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ — _ _ _ _ - _ — — —
Installment payment(s) (Insert total and attach itemized schedule
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) S P P

50.QQ
75.00
99.53

228.91

hplPW*

2,102.44

TOTAL EXPENSES

*Perma Green , $10.00; tithing, $160.00? cable
newspaper, $32.96.

TV

$25.95;

A-3

STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
1 swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

**' '

day of

A IJrn^

JitA

. 19 ^ f

Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County. Utah
My Commission Expires

BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO. PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED
CHECKS, CERTIFICATES. POLICIES, AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.
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RLS3 0?ST3iST SflUST
Tr,;rd JuGfCtal Dis&ftWY AT LAW
SUITE C-105
M A & 4 8 E & T 1Qg§H UNION AVENUE
I ini\
w « ^ ^ A L E > U T A H 34047
TELEPHONE
r .,, - .^r^v --v(89fV255-7600/566-1285
By

ueputy Clerk

February 10, 1989

Honorable John A. Rokich
District Court Judge
240 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Wilson vs. Wilson, Case No. D88-642

Dear Judge Rokich:
Pursuant to your request at Tuesday's hearing in the
above-jenti tied matter, I am enclosing a letter from
Granite School District concerning the amount of the
deduction from Mr. Wilson's' check which is directly
related to providing health and accident insurance for
the children.
When I prepared the Child Support
Guidelines, I estimated that amount at $50.00 per month.
The actual amount is $53.97.
We do not believe the
difference to be great and will consent to the entry of
child support based on our earlier calculations.
With respect to the division of the other monetary
assets, my client has suggested the following for your
consideration.
Should the home be awarded to him, he would suggest
that he also be awarded the Blazer and that Elizabeth be
awarded a $10,000.00 lien against the home and a $5,00.00
or $6,000.00 cash payment for her interest in the Blazer
and that she be given the entire amount currently in the
Redi-asset account of approximately $2,000.00. He would
also agree to pay out her interest in the home over a
five (5) year period of time. That would amount to an
additional $2,000.00 per year.
In total, she would
receive an immediate cash settlement of $8,000.00 or
$9,000.00 with which she could purchase a suitable
vehicle.
She would also be receiving approximately
$2,000.00 per year for the next five (5) years.
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Page Two
Honorable John A. Rokich
February 10, 1989
This proposal would give her some immediate cash with
which to begin a new life as well as quickly cashing out
her equity in the home. It would allow Mr. Wilson to
enjoy the physical gifts given to him by his parents and
would wave the tax loss associated with splitting the
IRA. In total, Elizabeth would receive $18,000.00 1
$20,000.00 in equity, all of which was donated by Mr.
Wilson's Father. If this amount is not satisfactory to
you, the amounts could be altered by the Court either up
or down.
Mr. Wilson believes that he could locate summer
employment to earn the funds sufficient to cover the
yearly payments.
I hope this may be of help to you in resolving this
matter.
I am filing herewith a coun ter-jAf f idavi t on the
issue of Attorney fees and am sending a copy of this
letter to Mrs. Wolbach.
Very truly yours,

LJC/dj
Enclosure
cc:

Mr. David Wilson
Mrs. Judith Wolbach

A

JUDITH ROMNEY W O L B A C H
A T T O R N E Y AT L A W
THE VALLEY TOWER. SUITE 9 0 0
50 WEST BROADWAY

F ^ 3 8iS7S!S7C8SaT
»ftira Judicial District

MAR

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 01

6 1989

(801 ) 3 6 3 - 6 2 2 2
S \LT LAKE S e u j T Y
By

Deputy Clerk

February 21/ 1989
Honorable John A. Rokich
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE: Wilson vs. Wilson
Case No. D88-642
Dear Judge Rokich:
Mrs. Wilson was hired/ as of yesterday, as a receptionist by
Attorneys Richard Bojanowski/ Jane Allen, Craig Coburn, Keith
Henderson/ Daniel Boone and Tony Thurber. Her rate of pay is $6.00
an hour, $960.00 a month.
The additional cost for day care at Montessori School, necessitated
by Mrs. Wilson's employment, is only $50.00 a month, bringing to
$500.00 a month the total cost of the children's day care and
education. It appears reasonable to me that at least two-thirds of
this cost, $333.00 (for the younger two children), should be
considered as the cost of day care necessary to permit Mrs. Wilson
to work.
I have brought this information to your attention by this informal
means / so that you would have it available for the purposes of
making your final ruling in these proceedings.
We are looking
forward to receiving your memorandum decision as soon as possible.
Sincerely/

Judith Rctnney Wolbach
JRW:rw
cc: Lynn J Clark/ Esq.
Elizabeth Wilson
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LYNN J CLARK, #4013
Attorney for Defendant
948 E. North Union Avenue
Suite -105
Midvale, Utah
84047
Telephone:
(801) 255-;7600

MAR

6

m

Oepmy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH A. WILSON,

PROPOSALS OF
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS

Plaintiff,
C a s e N o . D88-j642

vs.
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,

J u d g e J o h n A.

Defendant.
Pursuant
Wilson,
hereby

t o O r d e r of

by a n d
present

this

through
to

court,

his

c u s t o d y of t h e p a r t i e s 1

minor

Defendant,

Attorney,

the Court

his

Rokich
David

Lynn

proposals

J

R.

Clark,

concerning

children.

PREFACE
It
forth

is

the

what he b e l i e v e s

children
believes

and

his

that

continually
and

i n t e n t of D e f e n d a n t

should

controlling

in t h i s

proposal

to

set

t o be i n t h e b e s t

interest

of

his

Wife

he

is

and
the

demonstrated
be

awarded

himself.
parent

himself

1

who h a s
t o be t h e

either

p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y of

Defendant

prime

t h e minor

and

firmly
who

has

better

parent

or

least

at

children.

Defendant believes that joint legal custody of the
children pursuant to Section 30-j3-;10.1 et. seq. of the
Utah Code Ann. is proper in this instance subject to each
parents' pre-defined rights in certain areas.
Defendant believes that inspite of which parent the
Court may choose to be awarded physical or primary
physical custody of the children, an extremely
schedule of visitation

for the non-;custodial

liberal
parent

should be granted.
Specifically responding to the Court's request, the
following is submitted.
If the Plaintiff were to be awarded

the gr imagy

physical custody of the children and £_h£ £2i2^A£]i£.!L
reside in the Salt Lake County area,

tQ

Defendant would

propose the following visitation:
£ tY°Y 1.

Alternating weekends from Friday after school

through placing the children in school the following
Monday.

Such visitation would increase to include either

the Thursday night Friday period or the Monday, Monday
night period where a three (3) day weekend from school
is scheduled.
2.

One (1) night each week from the time school is

out until 8:00 p.m. that evening.

2
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A l t e r n a t i n g major h o l i d a y s i n c l u d i n g January 1 s t ,

Memorial DayT J u l y 4 t h , J u l y 24th, and Labor Day.'

Such

v i s i t a t i o n s t o begin the evening p r i o r to the holiday and
continue through t h e holiday u n t i l 8:00 p.m. except

for

the 4th and 24th of J u l y on which o c c a s i o n s the c h i l d r e n
s h o u l d spend t h e n i g h t w i t h D e f e n d a n t and be r e t u r n e d
home the next morning by 10:00 a.m.
4.

F a t h e r ' s Day, Defendant's b i r t h d a y , s i x (6) hours

on each of the c h i l d r e n ' s b i r t h d a y s .
5.

A l t e r n a t i n g T h a n k s g i v i n g s b e g i n n i n g Wednesday

e v e n i n g a t 6 : 0 0 p . m . and c o n t i n u i n g

through

Sunday

Evening a t 7:00 p.m.
6.

An a l t e r n a t i n g C h r i s t m a s v a c a t i o n w h e r e i n

the

c h i l d r e n would spend Christmas Eve and Christmas Day with
one p a r e n t and Christmas Day and the following
days with

the

other

parent.

Such

five

(5)

arrangement

to

a l t e r n a t e on a year by year b a s i s .
7.

Two-thirds (2/3) of the summer v a c a t i o n period to

begin no sooner than one (1) week a f t e r school i s out and
end no l a t e r t h a t one (Vi;) week p r i o r to school resuming.
8.

A separate

summer

visitation

with

the

grandparents of seven (7) days to be arranged during the

3
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summer

vacation

period,

together

with

reasonable

telephone access to the children.
If Defendant were to remain in Utah and be awarded
physical custody, he would suggest t:jiaj: J^he following
visitation be granted to the plaintiff:
Defendant

would

propose

essentially

the

same

visitation for Plaintiff as he had proposed for himself
except that he would propose that she be entitled to onehalf (1/2) of the summer vacation period.
He would add that he is willing to grant Plaintiff
additional unscheduled time as such time is requested by
Plaintiff for special events or other special needs. He
is also willing to be sensitive to the children's needs
as they individually or collectively may desire to see
their Mother during unscheduled periods of time.

LL ££AHJ: Zl2X5.i££i: £i^^-^2^X ^£££ to

b£ 2££J2^££LL

Defendant would propose the following:
Defendant believes that a joint custody arrangement
or something very near to it would be in the children1 s
best

interest.

He nevertheless

understands

that

communication and negotiation with Plaintiff is, at least
at this time nearly impossible.
4

He is suggesting that be

be granted the use of the marital home and that he be
designated

as the prime custodial parent.

Again,

visitation should be clearly defined with the possible
exception of special needs which may arise for either the
parents or the children.

Such visitation should provide

for nearly equal time for both parents.

The above

suggested schedules or that schedule suggested by Dr.
Victor Cline in his report would essentially cover those
needs.

The one exception Defendant would make to Dr.

Cline1s

recommendations

is that Dr. Cline1s

suggestion

that the non^prime custodian spend every weekend with the
children during the school year.

Such a schedule would

deprive the prime custodial parent of the ability to take
the children shopping, skiing or traveling for almost
nine (9) months of the year and would also prevent the
other parent from using those weekends for anything other
than visitations with the children.

For these reasons,

Defendant believes that weekend visitation should be
established as three

(3) per month rather than every

weekend.
Whjat: sJio^uJLd the ££s>u_lj: be LL ill® E^££Hi StJio il
assigned primary physical custody moves out of the State
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of U t a h 0£ .sU£]i d i s t a n c e

a s would f.£ii£^££jt < e Jthe

usual

visitation.
Defendant

believes

that

e n c o u r a g e d t o remain l i v i n g
location

for

the b e n e f i t

the

parties

should

i n t h e same c l o s e

of

the c h i l d r e n .

be

geographic
Although

he

has no p l a n s t o move and i s committed t o r e m a i n i n g in t h e
Salt

Lake a r e a ,

expressed

her

Plaintiff

intentions

While D e f e n d a n t
ongoing

has,
to

is employed

religious

on n u m e r o u s

leave

the S t a t e

commitment

h a s no such t i e s .

even though P l a i n t i f f
n o t worked f o r
trial

of

as w e l l

as

almost

is correct,

an employment t i e w i t h t h e
Defendant's

from

the

State

Salt

Lake

City

three

(3)

the

prison,
that

she

has

to

the

weeks a g o .

If

does n o t have even

State.
is

that

the Court o r d e r a

and when t h e c u s t o d i a l

to a l o c a t i o n
to

an

moral

t h e week p r i o r

Plaintiff

recommendation

custody review if

a

i s employed by Fred Meyer,

this matter,

Utah.

Defendant a l s o b e l i e v e s

t h a t company u n t i l

that information

of

i n S a l t Lake and f e e l s

commitment t o t h e i n m a t e s he m i n i s t e r s t o a t
Plaintiff

occasions

prevent

sufficiently
the

parent
distant

normally

moves
from

expected

visitation.
Should t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t chose t o move, such a

6

move would be at that parent's discretion, but that
parent would

be entitled

to the previously

defined

visitation to the extent that it could be accomplished
given the distances involved and the related expense.
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSAL OF CUSTODY
Defendant proposes

that he be granted

primary

physical custody of the three (3) minor children subject
to extremely liberal visitation and/or secondary physical
custody of the children.

He also proposes that he be

restored to the marital home.

These proposals are based

on the following:
1.

As was admitted by Plaintiff and substantiated by

virtually every witness, Plaintiff is a good Father and,
in fact, according to Dr. Cline, "the most committed
Father I have ever met."

Dr. Stewart also conceded that

Defendants

parenting skills were better than those of

Plaintiff.

His degree of involvement with the children

including playtime and education is much greater than has
been Plaintiff's.

He is more concerned with virtually

every facet of their lives including their dress, their
diet, their discipline, their education, their spiritual
development and their social development.

7

A-It

2.

The children should remain living in the marital

home as it provides a base of stability for them.

The

home, however, is also a burden as it requires constant
maintenance, repair and landscaping work.
Mrs. Wilson is not prepared, nor is she capable of
performing these functions herself.

Should she be

awarded the home, either the repairs, maintenance and
yard work will go undone, decreasing the value and
appearance of the home, or she will have to expend family
resources which are in short supply resulting

in those

funds not being available for the children.
Currently, Mr. Wilson is both trained and capable of
doing virtually all of the home maintenance and is in a
much better position to do so without having to trade
maintenance for the children's needs.
3.

As a further reason that Mr. Wilson should remain

in the home, we would point out that he is in a better
financial

position

to assume

the

increased

costs

associated with the home as compared to an apartment or
other rental.

He is gainfully

employed and has the

option of working some additional "overtime" type work.
Additionally, the funds used to purchase the home
have come substantially from Mr. Wilson's parents and he
8

should be entitled to enjoy the fruits of their gifts to
him.
What should be done with the equity in the home and
Blazer inasmuch as those items were purchased with funds
received by Defendant from his parents.
HOME
Testimony was clear that Defendant's parents provided
approximately Twenty Seven Thousand Dollars

($27,000.00)

which was used to purchase the marital home e

Seven

Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) of that amount was intended
to be in the form of a loan and irrespective of which of
the parties are awarded the home, that Seven Thousand
Dollars ($7,000.00) should be recognized by the Court as
a loan which is due to Mr. Wilson, Sr. and should be
included or considered as a liability which liability
should be assumed by the party being awarded the home.
The remaining Twenty Thousand Dollars

($20,000.00) was

received as an inheritance by Defendant from his parents
and was not a gift to both parties.

Nevertheless, these

people have little in the form of assets.

Should

Defendant be awarded the home, a faith and equitable lien
should be granted to the Plaintiff pending the re-}

9

marriage of Defendant, the children reaching majority or
the sale of the home.

Should Plaintiff be awarded the

home* She should be required to accept the home subject
to the current mortgage and the Seven Thousand Dollar
($7,000.00) loan from Mr. Wilson.

Defendant should be

granted a lien against the property

in a reasonable

amount to be determined by the Court.

Plaintiff should

be allowed to remain in the home for two (2) to three (3)
years subject to her assuming the mortgage and upkeep of
the home and it should thereafter be placed for sale and
the equity divided.
BLAZER
Again,
Mr.

t h e B l a z e r was p u r c h a s e d

Wilson

Seventeen

by

his

Thousand

parents.
Dollars

with

They

($17,000.00)

and a t r a d e - i n v e h i c l e w h i c h was u s e d

funds

supplied

given

to

nearly

by way of

cash

to purchase

the

vehicle.
A l t h o u g h t h e B l a z e r c o s t a l m o s t Twenty T h r e e Thousand
Dollars
value,

($23,000.00)
if

it

when i t was new,

were to

be s o l d ,

would

its
most

current
likely

net
be

$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 -j $ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 .
It

is

unfair

that

in a m a r r i a g e where the

10

parties

have relatively few assets that Plaintiff be awarded a
Twenty Three Thousand Dollar

($23,000.00) vehicle which

was essentially a gift to the Defendant while Defendant
is left to drive a nearly ten (10) year old pick-up truck
having some 95,000 miles on it.

True, it is in good

shape for a vehicle that old, but overall it should not
be expected

to last long as his primary

transportation.

source of

It currently is in need of new head

gaskets, a new windshield and some other minor repairs.
Defendant realizes
transportation

and

that Plainitff

has

suggested

is in need of

that

he

provide

Plaintiff with Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or such
other reasonable amount that the Court feels is just,
with which she can purchase a replacement vehicle.

That

amount is based on an approximate equal division of the
expected net proceeds were the Blazer to be sold.
If the Blazer is ordered sold, there will be a loss
to both parties, which loss could be avoided by awarding
the vehicle to Defendant with an equitable payment to
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that she needs dependable, safe
transportation

for herself and the children, Defendant

has those same needs.

Plaintiff could easily purchase
11

another vehicle which could meet her needs and Defendant
could have his gift restored to him under his proposal„
DATED this J

day of February, 1989.

y

L ttorriey

for Defendant
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JUDITH ROMNEY TOLBACH (3534)
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6222
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH A . WILSON,
Plaintiff,

ATTORNEY'S AFFIDAVIT

vs.
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,

Civil N o . D-88-642
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.

1. Plaintiff f s attorney is a member of the Utah State Bar Association
and

the Salt Lake County

Bar Association, duly

licensed

and admitted to

practice law in the State and Federal Courts of Utah and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
2. Plaintiff's

attorney

commenced

the practice of law in 1975, and

since that time has devoted most of her practice to family law.
3.

Her hourly

rate

for legal

services

is $95.00 an hour, with no

differential for court work.
4. Upon inquiry, this rate appears t o be scmewhat below the moderate
range in the community, for an attorney with her skill and experience, in the
practice

of family

law.

Overall, in the practice of family

law in the

conmunity, the range in attorney's fees is frcm $75.00 to $150.00 an hour.
5. Plaintiff's total

attorney's

fees

in this action, to date, are

A ~ZO

$10/241c00/ plus her costs/ as set forth in the schedule attached hereto. It
is anticipated that approximately five more hours, $475.00 in fees, will be
required for the hearing on February 7, 1989/ and preparing the Findings of
Fact/ Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.
6.

In

addition,

the

plaintiff

has

incurred

expenses, including

attorney's fees and costs of court, in the approximate amount of $1,450, for
her prior representation by Kenn Hanson, Esq.
7. The primary issue in this case has been custody of the children. It
is of significance, when considering the issue of attorneyfs fees, that the
defendant took the position, as set forth in his Answer, that the plaintiff is
lacking in emotional stablility, suffers from a post-abortion syndrome, and is
therefore unfit to have custody of the children. Apparently proceding on that
premise, he insisted on the plaintiff undergoing four evaluations:

first by

Dr. Fisher; second by Dr. Praman; third, by Dr. Stewart, and, fourth, by Dr.
Cline. This fact alone greatly increased the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
8. The defendant has prepared, or has caused to be prepared, many
documents in which he has attempted to besmirch the character and reputation
of the plaintiff, many of which are presently on file with the Court, and many
of which, his counsel indicated, would be introduced at trial. Most of these
documents were lengthy and hand-written.

It was necessary for plaintiff's

attorney to read and analyze these documents, which took many hours that
otherwise would have been unnecessary.
9. On a number of occasions, plaintiff's attorney has been informed by
Mr. Clark that his client, the defendant, wanted to pick up his personal
belongings.

Mr. Clark was advised that his client could pick up his clothing
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and other personal effects if he would agree on a date and hour for doing so.
No arrangements were ever made for this purpose, and the complaints continued,
again increasing the plaintiff's attorney's fees unnecessarily.
10. The defendant overreacted when there were problems with visitation,
on several occasions calling the police. Again, this caused the plaintiff to
incur

additional

attorney's

fees

which

otherwise would

not have been

necessary.
11. The defendant has acted in a manner consistent with his desire to
postpone the granting of a divorce, which has caused the plaintiff to incur
additional legal expenses.
12. The defendant has taken the unwarranted position that the plaintiff
is entitled to no part of the property acquired during the marriage (other
than some furniture), totally disregarding the fact that the pre-marital
assets of the defendant have been co-mingled with marital assets from the very
outset of the marriage of the parties.
13. Since the trial, the plaintiff attempted to negotiate a settlement
of the personal property of the parties, exclusive of motor vehicles, as
directed by the Court. The defendant has insisted that the plaintiff make all
of the concessions; he will make none.
14. The defendant has taken a dogmatic, absolutist

stance with respect

to all of the issues in these divorce proceedings, which has made negotiation
of a settlement impossible, increasing the costs of this action inneasurably.
15. It appears that the defendant has had unlimited funds to spend in
this divorce action, and that he has attempted to do his best to intimidate
the plaintiff through his superior spending capability. Consider, for example
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that he paid the expenses of lay witnesses brought in from Idaho and Wyoming.
16. The undersigned began her representation of the plaintiff on or
about June 6, 1988, as successor counsel to Kenn Hanson, who had rroved frcm
the State. During that month, counsel spent 7.5 hours representing the
plaintiff, including but not limited to telephone conferences with Mr. Hanson
(0.5 hour),

conferences with the plaintiff

(2.25 hours), reviewing Mr.

Hanson's and the Court's files, reviewing documents provided by the plaintiff
(1.5

hours),

reviewing

reviewing

post-abortion

and analyzing

Dr. Prammanf s report

syndrome materials

in the file

(0.75 hr.),

(0.5 hour), and

drafting a Motion for Temporary Relief and a proposed Stipulation (1/5 hour).
17. In July, 1988, the attempts for settlement having failed, the
defendant filed an Order to Show Cause and hearing was had thereon and on
plaintiff's Response, before Commissioner Peuler. A second hearing was held
inmediately thereafter before Judge Rokich on the issue of summer visitation,
and the remaining issues were taken under advisement by the Commissioner.
Extensive research was undertaken by the undersigned during this month on the
factual and legal issues concerning custody, as framed by the defendant.

A

total of 7.75 hours were billed to the plaintiff during this month.
18. In August, 1988, the parties received the Conmissioner's Memorandum
Recommendation, and the defendant filed his Objection thererto. The plaintiff
served Interrogatories on the defendant. There were several conferences with
the plaintiff, primarily concerning visitation, custody, and the children's
school. During this month, the undersigned filed a Certification of Readiness
for Trial with the Court, asking that trial be scheduled before September 22,
1988, as Dr. Stewart's report would be ready by that date and discovery would

-4-

A-ZS

be completed. Total time this month, 4.5 hours.
19. Mr. Clark scheduled hearing on his Objections to the Commissioner's
August 9th Recomnendations for September 13th.

Hearing on the plaintiff's

Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories was scheduled for the same date.
At the hearing, Mr. Clark advised the Court that he desired to obtain another
custody evaluation, which was strongly objected to by the undersigned. Mr.
Clark was given leave by the Court to obtain this evaluation. The plaintiff's
Motion to Compel was not heard, due to time constraints. On September 15th, a
pretrial was held before Commissioner Peuler, after which, a two-day trial was
scheduled. Dr. Stewart's Custody Evaluation was on file with the Court by
September 21st and was subsequently reviewed by the undersigned. Total time
for September and October, 4.25 hours.
20. During November, plaintiff's attorney prepared and served upon the
defendant Requests for Production and responded to the defendant's discovery,
having previously reviewed and analyzed the documents and information provided
by the plaintiff. There were several in-office and telephone conferences with
the plaintiff during this month. Total this month, 3.75 hours.
21. During December, counsel for the plaintiff reviewed and analyzed
information pertaining to physical and mental abuse of the plaintiff during
the marriage, subpoenaed documents frcm GMAC, consulted with Dr. Stewart and
dealt with Dr. Cline, by telephone and letter, in attempts to acquire a copy
of his report and of the video he had prepared. Total this month, 2.25 hours.
22. In January, 1989, plaintiff's attorney spent over 26.75 hours in
trial preparation, prior to commencement of trial. This included:
(a) Reading

and analyzing

Dr. Cline's report, viewing his video
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interviews, research

concerning

relevant rules of evidence, and initial

preparation of his examination, 6.0 hours.
(b) Consulting with Dr. Stewart, analyzing her report, and preparation
of her examination, 4.0 hours.
(c) Conducting general legal research on property and custody issues,
2.5 hours.
(d) Reviewing and analyzing the many documents in the file, including
the long letter to the Cormissioner filed by the defendant and the Affidavits;
reviewing and analyzing the proposed exhibits received from the defendant;
reviewing

and

analyzing

his Answers

to plaintiff's

Interrogatories

and

Response to our Request for Production and cross-checking with documents and
allegations made elsewhere in his dossier; reviewing and analyzing a long
letter and compilation mailed by defendant to plaintiff's parents and sisters
concerning her abortion and alleged boyfriends, 8.5 hours. (Note that almost
all of this material was hand written.)
(e) Answering and responding to the defendant's final Interrogatories
and Requests for Production, 1.0 hr.
(f) Conputing child support and drafting proposal for distribution of
property and for payment of alimony and child support, 1.5 hours.
(g) Preparing the initial outline for examination of the defendant and
the plaintiff, 3.25 hours.
23. After commencement of the trial, until the end of the month,
January,

45.5 hours

in

legal

services were provided to the plaintiff,

including:
(a) The first day of trial, January 12th, including preparation before
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the trial and review and preparation of summation of the testimony following
the afternoon recess, 11.0 hours.
(b) The second day of trial, January 13th, 8.0 hours, plus a conference
with Dr. Stewart following the afternoon recess, 0.5 hour.
(c) The third day of

trial, January 17th, 9.0 hours, including

preparation and preparation of summation of testimony.
(d) The fourth day of trial, January 14th, 4.5 hours.
(e) On January 14th through 16th, telephone conferences with client,
witness preparation, consultation with Dr. Stewart, research and review and
prepartion of examination, 10.0 hours.
(f) After the trial, various telephone calls with opposing counsel and
with plaintiff concerning the visitation schedule and other matters, and
drafting of plaintiff's proposal for visitation, 2.5 hours.
24.

During February, 1989, to

the date of this Affidavit, the

undersigned has provided 6.0 hours in legal services for further workon the
visitation
household

schedule and
furniture and

for preparation

of

a

proposed

distribution of

furnishings, including telephone calls with the

plaintiff and with opposing counsel, legal research and preparation of final
argument.
24. The services provided to the plaintiff by her attorney have been
necessary to protect her interests and the charges for these services are
reasonable.

However, it is estimated that the cost of her representation is

double that which it would have been, had the defendant been willing to
negotiate, and had he taken a more reasonable position regarding the issues in
dispute.
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DATED this

(Q ^

day of February, 1989.

JUDITH ROMNEY ^WOLBACH
Attorney for Plaintiff

SIGNED AND SWORN to before me tftJsHLg

day of February, 1989.

NOTARY PUBLI^, Tesidin^ in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
On the 7th day of February, 1989, I hand delivered a copy of the
foregoing Affidavit to counsel for the defendant, Lynn J Clark, at the Courts
Building, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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Plaintiff's Costs of Court and Expenses

1. Services of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart

$1/128.00

2. Witness fees

41.40

3c

24.00

Constable

4. Copies and postage

150.65

5. Copy of Dr. Cline's video

25.00

6. Runner

10.00

TOTAL:

$1,379.05

A-Z2
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A W t 8 1989

LYNN J CLARK #4013
Attorney for Defendant
948 E. North Union Avenue
Suite C-7IO5
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone:

t-^puty Clerk

25 5-760 0
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION
OF MINUTE ENTRY, OBJECTIONS
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSION
AND DECREE
AND
MOTION TO RECONSIDER JUDGMENT AS SET FORTH IN THE
COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY.

ELIZABETH A. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,
Defendant.

Civil No.

D-88-;642

J u d g e John A. Rokich
D e f e n d a n t David W i l s o n ,
Lynn J C l a r k ,
following
1.

by and t h r o u g h h i s

respectfully

moves

this

Attorney,

Court

for

the

relief:
To c l a r i f y

this

Court's

written

Memorandum

D e c i s i o n d a t e d March 6, 1989.
2.
Findings

To O b j e c t
of

Fact,

to

portions

Conclusions

of
of

Plaintiff's

proposed

Law a n d D e c r e e

of

D i v o r c e and
3.

To r e q u e s t

that

this

Court reconsider

portions

of i t s Memorandum D e c i s i o n .

A-z?

PART I
Clarification of Memorandum Decision
Several inconsistencies between what is contained in
the Court's Memorandum Decision and what was communicated
to counsel by telephone have led to questions concerning
the final order.

Additionally,

there

are

issues

pertinent to the final judgement that are not addressed
by the Memorandum Decision.

Those issues need to be

addressed.
1.

Paragraph Six (6) on page Five (5) of the decision is
so worded as to allow Defendant only Christmas eve
and

Christmas

morning

alternating years.

with

his

children

on

Defendant believes that he should

be granted at least one half (1/2) of the children's
school vacation period each year in addition to the
Christmas eve/Christmas day visitation as provided.
2.

Paragraph Seven
(8) of

the

visitation.

(7), One-jThree

Decision

(1-3) on page Eight

provides

for

grandparent

It does not provide for visitation with

the children by the paternal grandparents

during

visits they may make to Utah during other times of
the year.

While they could certainly visit with the

children during Defendant's

2

scheduled

visitation

periods, it is possible that their visit may not
coincide with Defendant's schedule.

Defendant prays

that the paternal grandparents be allowed the right
to visit with the children for a reasonable time on
those occasions when they are in Utah.
Paragraph One

(1) on page Seven

(7) awards the

parties home to Plaintiff and purports to equally
divide the equity

therein

between

the parties.

However, there is no mention of or consideration of
the Seven Thousand

dollar

($7,000.00)

loan

from

Defendant's father used by the parties to purchase
the home.

Likewise, there is no

in the Court's findings.

mention of the loan

If, in fact, Defendant's

father is to be denied that loan or if it is the
Court's intention to make Defendant's portion of the
equity subject to that loan, sufficient findings and
conclusions and a final judgement should be rendered
on that issue.
Paragraph Two (2) of page Seven (7) purports to award
one half (1/2) of both Defendants IRA account and his
Ready Asset account to Plaintiff.

The uncontroverted

testimony at trial was that these funds belonged to
Defendant prior to the marriage and had never been

3

commingled.

There are no findings

by the Court

concerning the ownership of these funds.

There was

no evidence at the trial concerning Plaintiff's need
for them.

Given

that there was no finding

that

Plaintiff either owned any interest in those funds
nor that she demonstrated an actual future need for
those funds, Defendant believes that findings of fact
should be entered justifying the current award.
In documents filed with the Court, Plaintiff was
shown to have received approximately Eight Thousand,
Five Hundred dollars ($8,500.00) in jewelry and other
items as an inheritance.

The Court was asked to

determine whether or not that property should be
divided

between

the parties as was

Defendants

inheritance used to purchase the parties home.

Again

no findings were included in the Memorandum Decision
on this issue.
Paragraph One (1) on page Seven (7) dealing with the
Blazer awards

Plaintiff Sixty-Five percent (65%) of

the acknowledged value of that vehicle at the time of
the trial.

there was no finding of fact concerning

the net value of the vehicle or of
ability to pay this amount.

4

Defendant's

Some guidance on the

basis of this award should be given, especially in as
much as the funds used to purchase the vehicle were a
gift to Defendant from his father.
Child support, on page Eight (8) , was decreed to be
awarded on the basis of the Child
Lines.

Notwithstanding the

Support Guide

fact that the previous

guidelines have been repealed by the legislature,
there

is a discrepancy

between

the

worksheets

provided by Plaintiff and the worksheet provided by
Defendant.
Defendant's worksheet is attached hereto and is based
upon his actual job related income.
employed by his father's

Defendant is not

corporation

and has no

contractual right to receive a director's fee in the
future.

Further, even if this income is available in

the future, Defendant does not now have those funds
and cannot therefore use them as a means of satisfying
a current child support obligation.

Should the funds

be considered, they should be

considered in light of

their

of

real

nature,

that

a gift

to

him.

Alternatively, those funds have an associated tax
consequence to Defendant which reduces the actual
amount available to him.

5

Day care expenses are not covered in the Decision
either in the findings of fact nor in the award
portion.

Because neither of these parties have the

financial ability to keep their children enrolled in
the Montessori school system, and since one of the
children should be attending public school on a fulltime basis and a second kindergarten age child could
be attending public school on a one half
b a s i s , any award

of child

support

(1/2) time
should

be

calculated for only that time the children could not
be in public schools and at a rate that could be
obtained by a private baby sitter in the children's
neighborhood.

Further, consideration should be given

to the fact that Defendant could watch the children
virtually every day and that such supervision would
not only lower the day care expense, but would
benefit the children by spending that time with their
father.
The Court has awarded Plaintiff alimony in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty dollars

($250.00) per month

without having made a finding that she requires that
income, or that she is entitled to such a lifetime
award of that income after a Six (6) year marriage to

6

Defendant or that Defendant has the financial ability
to pay such sum.

Findings based on the evidence

aduced at trial should be made to support such a
judgement or the judgement should be modified.
10. The Court has made no finding with respect to whether
or not the Attorney's fees claimed by Plaintiff have
or have not already been paid. No finding has been
made as to the reasonableness of the fees claimed,
nor has there been a finding made which establishes
that Defendant cannot even pay his own Attorney's
fees.

Given that the parties parents have paid for

their fees and that Defendant's parents have also
paid for an extremely expensive report prepared by
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and a report prepared by Dr.
Cline, some basis for such an award of fees to one
party by the other party who is incapable of paying
additional fees should be supported.
PART ri
Objection to Plaintifff s Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
Plaintiff,
Conclusions

of

in

preparing

Law and

her

Decree

of

Findings
Divorce

of
has

numerous statements which a r e e i t h e r not c o n s i s t e n t

7

Fact,
made
with

the Court's
extensions

findings
of

or which a r e e i t h e r

the Court's

u n s u p p o r t e d by t h e C o u r t ' s
1.

Paragraph
beyond

Three

any

while

with

or

are

entirely

Memorandum.

of

Plaintiff's

pronouncement

paragraph,
Defendant

(3)

statements

unreasonable

of

this

containing

a wide

brush,

findings

some

go

Court.

That

truth,

attempting

far

paints

to

portray

him a s t h e s o l e s o u r c e of c o n t e n t i o n i n t h e m a r r i a g e .
Trial

testimony

during

the

was

that

marriage,

but

Defendant
that

had

not

Plaintiff

changed

had

simply

changed h e r mind a b o u t what she wanted and t h a t
she wanted
testimony
provoked
conflicts

w a s no l o n g e r
was

also

Defendant

the

defendant.

to

the

effect

into

the

Two

t h a t were t e s t i f i e d

to.

that

(2)

minor

2.

Paragraph
from
there

Nine

(9)

the Court's
was l i t t l e

subject.
was n o t

of

Plaintiff's

to

Plaintiff
physical
fact

divorce.

finding

is

taken

Memorandum D e c i s i o n ,

but

in

fact

if

all

on

that

any

Dr S t e w a r t ' s
able

Trial

The C o u r t in

found t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s had g r o u n d s f o r

what

control

testimony

testimony
or

at

was

discipline

that
the

Plaintiff
children

effectively..
3.

P a r a g r a p h Nine (9) "L" r e c i t e s a n o t h e r f i n d i n g by t h e

8

Court which states that Defendant's belief about a
wife's role be submissive and passive.
evidence

There was no

from Defendant on this point at all.

Defendant does not have such a belief as it is stated
in the Memorandum.
4.

Paragraph Nine (9) "0" states that Plaintiff upgraded
her parenting skills.

Since Doctor Stewart did not

see or meet with Plaintiff after her parenting class,
she could not know if Plaintiff attended the class or
if her attendance had improved her weak parenting
skills.
5.

Paragraph Eleven (11) "F" of the proposed findings is
believed

to be incorrect in that it would

limit

Defendant's Christmas visitation to about Thirty-Six
(36) hours every other year.
6.

Defendant believes that the paternal grandparents
should also have the right to reasonable visitation
with the children during times when the grandparents
might be visiting in Utah.

7.

Paragraph Sixteen

(16) does not follow the Court's

Memorandum decision at all as no such figures are
included.

While the defendant's prison and school

income are the subject of contracts, the director's

9
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fee

is

n o t and t h e r e

continue.
an

($2,000.00)

summer

income of

in Defendant's

be s t r i c k e n .

school

no i n d i c a t i o n

that

t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y no b a s i s f o r

imaginary

should

is

job

available

and
to

be

income and t h a t

job

considered

8.

Paragraph

Seventeen

Plaintiff's
Court's

(17)

Attorney

is

that

the

only

as

a basis

a year

preferring

to even

an

for

for

the

awards.
inclusion

Plaintiff

look

his

income

is not supported

Memorandum d e c i s i o n .

almost

from

is

also

dollars
statement

income

c o m p u t a t i o n of c h i l d s u p p o r t a n d / o r o t h e r

will

including

Two Thousand

Plaintiff's

prison

it

by

by

the

refused

for

a meaningful

job,

t o l i v e on s u p p o r t p a i d by D e f e n d a n t .

The

C o u r t n o t e d t h a t s h e i s a c o l l e g e e d u c a t e d p e r s o n who
i s c a p a b l e of much more t h a n she i s
9.

Paragraph Eighteen

(18)

is further

doing.
n o t founded

in any

f i n d i n g made by t h e C o u r t .
10. P a r a g r a p h

Twenty

(20)

D e f e n d a n t which i s n o t
11. P a r a g r a p h Twenty-One
findings

a s s u m e s an i n c o m e l e v e l
correct.
(21)

place
Further

of

Plaintiff's

i s a g a i n b a s e d on P l a i n t i f f ' s

dreams and n o t on e i t h e r
reality.

Two

children
(2)

of

the

proposed
Attorney's

the C o u r t ' s decision

These p a r t i e s c a n n o t s u p p o r t

their

for

in

the

children

two homes and

Montessori
could

nor on

be

school.
attending

10
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free public school.
should

be b a s e d

considering
should

be

Any award of funds

on t h e

reasonable

t h a t Two (2)
in

public

of

f o r day

cost

of

day

the c h i l d r e n

shcool

each

care
care

could

day.

or

Since

D e f e n d a n t ' s work s c h e d u l e would a l l o w him t o t e n d
children

virtually

every

working

day,

that

the
fact

s h o u l d a l s o s e r v e t o modify any such a w a r d .
12. T h e r e

is

no b a s i s

for

the

finding

Plaintiff

i n c l u d e d i n P a r a g r a p h Twenty-Two (22) of h e r
of

has

Findings

Fact.

13. Paragraph

Twenty-jThree

(23)

of

Plaintiff's

f i n d i n g s b e a r no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e C o u r t ' s
and d o n o t

comport with

state

law

in

that

proposed
findings
either

p a r t y can o n l y be o r d e r e d t o o b t a i n such i n s u r a n c e

if

i t i s a v a i l a b l e t o them t h r o u g h t h e i r employment a t a
reasonable
14. P a r a g r a p h

cost.
Twenty-jFour

(24)

is

not

based

on

the

no f i n d i n g s

that

would

support

C o u r t ' s Memorandum d e c i s i o n .
15. There a r e a b s o l u t e l y
the

l a n g u a g e found

Plaintiff's,

proposed f i n d i n g s .

t o add t o g e t h e r
child

support,

($409.00),

in Paragraph

day

Twenty-Five
In f a c t ,

t h e amounts P l a i n t i f f
Four
care,

Hundred

and

Two h u n d r e d

if

One

of

one were

suggests

Nine

and

(25)

as

dollars
dollars

11
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($201o00) and alimony, Two Hundred Fifty dollars
($250.00), the total becomes Eight Hundred

Sixty

dollars

total

($860.00) per month.

Defendants

monthly take home pay is approximately One Thousand,
Three Hundred Thirty-jNine dollars ($1,339.00) per
month.

the proposed awards equal Sixty-;Four percent

(64%) of Defendants disposable income, an amount
which cannot even be legally collected by way of wage
garnishment.

Assuming that such an amount were to be

paid, Plaintiff would enjoy a monthly income of One
Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty dollars ($1,820.00), an
increase from the total family income prior to the
marriage of some Four Hundred Eighty-One dollars
($481.00)

per month

or Thirty-;Six

percent

increase.

Defendant cannot possibly provide a home

for himself and for his children for

(36%)

approximately

one half (1/2) of each year, provide transportation,
food, clothing, insurance or other necessities.
There is no Court finding that she is entitled to
life long alimony after

a Six (6) year marriage,

especially given her age and education.
Plaintiff lists marital assets as including numerous
items.

The Court has not made such a list included
12

as its findings.

Particularly, the 1979 pickup truck

which has belonged solely to Defendant since Four (4)
years prior to the marriage.
Sub Paragraph

(e) of paragraph Twenty-Eight

(28) is

also contrary to the facts and is not supported by
findings established by the Court.

the Court did not

find that either the Merrill Lynch IRA account or the
Ready Asset account were marital

property.

The

uncontroverted trial testimony was that the accounts
were both owned by Defendant prior to the marriage,
that Plaintiff has never had an interest in either
account, has never deposited her funds in either
account and that the funds have not generally been
used for marital debt.
Paragraph Twenty-jNine

(29) states that the loan of

Seven Thousand dollars ($7,000.00) was made only to
Defendant.

The Court made no finding on this issue.

The uncontested testimony at trial by Defendant's
father was that it was a loan to both Plaintiff and
Defendant and that both were aware it was a loan and
both agreed to repay it.
No finding by the Court was entered as to the loans
collectability as that question was not at issue
before this Court.
13

Paragraph

Thirty-(Three

respects

and

is

(33)

not

is

in

supported

error
by

in

the

several
Court's

Memorandum d e c i s i o n .
The p a r t i e s

traded

in a c a r ,

not a t r u c k

as

stated.

The c a r used as a p a r t of t h e down payment was a
t o D e f e n d a n t by h i s

gift

father.

The Ready A s s e t a c c o u n t from which D e f e n d a n t

withdrew

about

was

One T h o u s a n d

dollars

($1,000.00)

" t h e i r " account, but r a t h e r belonged to
Paragraph
findings

Thirty-Five

(35)

is not supported

decision.

The t r u c k

of

Defendant.

Plaintiff's

by t h e C o u r t ' s

has

been

not

proposed
Memorandum

Defendant's

separate

p r o p e r t y s i n c e he p u r c h a s e d i t a p p r o x i m a t e l y Four
years

prior

to

the

marriage.

Further,

order in the C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n

requiring

r e p u r c h a s e h i s v e h i c l e from
Paragraph T h i r t y - S i x
and

is

not

Defendant
several

supported

received

years

(36)

prior

to

was s o l d s h o r t l y p r i o r
deposited

t o an a c c o u n t

Defendant.

14

is

no

Defendant

to

Plaintiff.

is also factually
by

real

there

the

Court's

property
the

(4)

from

marriage.

incorrect
findings.

his

parents

The

property

t o t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e
owned s o l e l y ,

funds

even t o d a y

by

1. Paragraph Thirty-?Seven (37) of the proposed findings
are also factually incorrect and are not supported by
the Court's findings.
Defendant paid tithing

Both parties, not just the
of Five Thousand

dollars

($5,000.00). The innuendo concerning the "prior gift"
to Defendant, inferring that it was also a wedding
gift is incorrect as it was given to Defendant prior
to the time he ever met Plaintiff.

The remainder of

the funds, some Three Thousand dollars
were spent on family expenses.

($3,000.00)

There was no court

finding that the funds were ever commingled.

Even if

they were, the extent of any possible commingling
would be Three Thousand dollars ($3,000.00).
2. Paragraph Th ir ty-;E igh t (38)
incorrect and

is both

is not supported

factually

by the

Court's

findings.

The IRA account was not the "Parties" IRA

account.

It belonged solely to Defendant and was

funded with monies that belonged to Defendant years
prior to the conception of the marriage.

Only a

small portion of the funds in that account were
expended on family obligations.

The amount withdrawn

being equal to the remainder of the gift to the
parties by Defendant's parents.

15

39, Again

Paragraph Thirty-^Nine

inadequate and not supported.

(39)

is

factually

The IRA account is a

mutual fund stock account and its value varies as
does the stock market.

No current

figures were

presented to the Court concerning the value of that
account at the trial.

The value set forth on the

Ready Asset account is an amount imagined or supposed
to be correct by Plaintiff's counsel and again bears
no factual relationship to the actual balance of that
account.
40c The Court did not find that either or both of these
accounts were marital assets, only that Plaintiff
should be paid one half (1/2) of those accounts.

The

Court placed no value on those interests as that
information was and currently is unavailable to the
Court.
Defendant further objects to the Plaintifff s proposed
conclusions of law as set forth below;
1.

In Paragraph Two

(2), Plaintiff's reference to the

grounds for divorce is in error.

The Court made no

finding in its Memorandum decision concerning the
grounds for divorce and Defendant believes that the
same should be listed as irreconcilable differences.
16

It

is

clear

Plaintiff's

that

the

emerging

other companionship.
is

both

inaccurate

divorce

maturity

resulted

and

desire

from

to

A conclusion

of m e n t a l

and a n e e d l e s s

disservice

seek

cruelty
to

the

P a r a g r a p h S i x (6) i s made o u t s i d e of t h e scope of

the

Defendant.

Court's

Memorandum d e c i s i o n .

intends

to include

Defendant,
account

i.e.,

and

the separate

his

his

Further,

pickup

Plaintiff

property

IRA a c c o u n t ,

1979

if

his

truck,

owned

Ready

by

Asset

those

items

c l e a r l y b e l o n g e d t o him y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e .
Paragraph

Seven

(7)

of

the

to as not

being supported

supported

by

findings

and

conclusions

are

objected

by t h e f i n d i n g s ,
figures

as

and

or

imagined

by

P l a i n t i f f s counsel.
Paragraph

Eight

insupportable.
Thousand
Court.

(8)

The

dollars

of

the

collectability

($7,000.00)

Further this

it

was made i n

Quantum M e r i t ,

was

of
not

the

good

the

which can

a c c e p t e d t h e l o a n and

faith.

On t h e

basis

the Court could have s e p a r a t e d

l o a n o u t of t h e a p p a r e n t e q u i t y i n t h e home,

17

is

Seven

before

i s a C o u r t of e q u i t y ,

surely recognize that Plaintiff
that

conclusions

of
the

awarded

that additional equity to Defendant and ordered him
to assume that debt.

It would

certainly not be

inequitable for Plaintiff's equity to be offset by a
loan she accepted.

To allow her to retain the

benefits of that loan is to allow her to enjoy the
benefits of an unjust enrichment at the expense of
her father-in-law.
Defendant Objects to Plaintifff s Proposed
Decree of Divorce as Follows:
lc

Paragraph Three

(3) "f" concerning

the Christmas

visitation period for the reasons stated above.
2.

Paragraph Six (6) relating to grandparent visitations
for the reasons stated above.

3.

Paragraphs Eight (8) and Nine

(9) as they do not

comply with the Court's order.
4.

Paragraph Ten

(10) because it does not comply with

state law governing the obligation to obtain health
and accident insurance for the children.
5.

Paragraph Eleven (11) because it is uncollectable
under state law.

6.

Paragraph Seventeen

(17) as it does not follow the

written Memorandum decision of the Court.

18
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7c

Paragraphs Eighteen

(18) and Nineteen

(19) as they

are not factually correct and do not reflect the
written order of the Court in this matter.
PAIjT III
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement
This motion is brought pursuant to Rule Fifty-jNine
(59) "e" of the .Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant respectfully moves this Court to reconsider
its judgement in this matter for the following reasons:
1. Plaintiff

is not the most fit parent to have

custody of the children.
2.

The award of child support, day care expenses and

alimony are excessive and not collectible under current
state law.

Further, should such an order continue, it

would force Defendant onto the state welfare rolls
in spite of his working more than 47 hours each week.
3.

The award of virtually all of Defendants separate

property

to Plaintiff

is patently

unfair

to both

Defendant and to his children.
Point One
Plaintiff offered virtually no testimony from any
creditable source to bolster her claim as a fit parent.
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The t e s t i m o n y of Dr. S t e w a r t was t h a t s h e had n e v e r
in P l a i n t i f f ' s
outside

of

home, had n e v e r met o r known

her o f f i c e

t h a n Ten

(10)

spending

several

Stewart's
effective

and

hours,

report

those

during

hours

indicated

totaled

time

the

that

Plaintiff

parenting

Dr.

Stewart

was

MMPI T e s t .

Plaintiff

Plaintiff's

recommended

fewer

Plaintiff

not

Defendant

skills

that

Dr.

was

a t d e a l i n g w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n and t h a t

that

All

which

taking

had b e t t e r p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s .
poor

meetings

been

were so

she

take

a

class.
or

virtually

acquaintances

all

appeared

of

the

party's

friends

i n C o u r t and t e s t i f i e d

the care they observed the c h i l d r e n

and

concerning

to r e c e i v e

from

both

parents.
Each of
that

witnesses

i n e v e r y a r e a of

either

below

concern,
hug,

the

kiss

parenting

average

even t o Dr.

who t e s t i f i e d

or

or o t h e r w i s e

noticed

show a f f e c t i o n

most a b o u t
to the

remiss.

for

testified

Elizabeth

children.

was

20

Court

that
that

No one

was

Of

most

who d i d
her

e v e r p l a y i n g w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n or s p e n d i n g
them.

the

Plaintiff

was a Mother

show a f f e c t i o n

E v e r y w i t n e s s who t e s t i f i e d ,
they

skills,

severely

Stewart,

told

not

children.
the

thing

she did

not

remembered

her

time

teaching

In s p i t e of t h e C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g
i n t h e blame f o r
were f e d ,

the poor

manner

t h a t Defendant
i n which

the

shared

children

c l o t h e d and s u p e r v i s e d ,

t e s t i m o n y was t h a t such

p r a c t i c e c o n t i n u e d when P l a i n t i f f

was s o l e l y in c h a r g e of

the c h i l d r e n .

The n e i g h b o r s

o f t e n o u t s i d e from 7:30 a.m.
p.m. w i t h o u t
the

apparent

children,

testified

in

They

testified

that

care,

were

Plaintiff's

unsupervised

while neighborhood

off.

testified

They

that

fireworks

they

were b e i n g

observed

s c o l d i n g R a c h e l when she f e l l

from a t r u c k

and

no e m o t i o n a l

that

Plaintiff

comfort.

offered

They a l s o t e s t i f i e d

was n o t m a t c h i n g ,

didn't

that

look

of

the p a r t i e s ,

testified
children

was t h e

attire

n e a t and was o f t e n

dirty.

that

skills.

he was t h e r e

was n o t .

the

home,

who s h o w e d

was t h e i r
for

friends

t h e Wilson

Defendant
It

or

the c h i l d r e n ' s

who s p e n t much time i n
it

street

support

(5) w i t n e s s e s who were i n t i m a t e

l o v e and c o n c e r n .

testimony
Plaintiff

that

set

Plaintiff

in the

T h i s i s n o t a mother who h a s p r o p e r p a r e n t i n g
Each of F i v e

were

t o as l a t e a s 10:00 t o 10:30

supervision.

while

the children

the

uncompromising

children

while

Those who have had c o n t a c t with David

since the p a r t i e s separation t e s t i f i e d

t h a t he took

great

c a r e i n b a t h i n g and k e e p i n g t h e c h i l d r e n c l e a n and n e a t .
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They testified that he prepared well balanced meals for
them.

That he played with them and educated

them.

Mostly, and most importantly, he showers them with love.
Dr. Victor Cline, an extremely prominent local teacher
and Psychologist visited with David and with the children
not only in his office, but in the Wilson home.

Although

he found both of the parties to have some minor flaws, he
found and so stated in his report, that David was the
most committed father he had ever met.
To align David's record of love, care and attention
to the children alongside of Elizbethfs unloving, lack of
concern for the children should leave the court a very
clear choice that he is by far the better parent.
Point Two
The Court has awarded

child

support, day

expenses and alimony to Plaintiff.

care

The amounts of the

child care expenses were not established

by the Court,

but taking Plaintiff fs made-;up figures of Four Hundred
and Nine dollars ($409.00) for child support, Two hundred
and one dollars

($201.00) for day care and Two Hundred

and Fifty dollars
monthly
($860.00)

award
per

($250.00) for alimony, the total

is Eight
month.

Hundred

and

Considering
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Sixty

that

dollars

Defendant's

disposable income totals only One Thousand Three Hundred
Thirty-Nine dollars

($1,339.00), were Defendant to pay

Plaintiff Eight Hundred and Sixty dollars ($860.00) each
month, he would be left with Four Hundred Seventy-Nine
dollars ($479.00) per month.

Given that he also has been

ordered to assume the Blazer payment of One Hundred
dollars
Hundred

($100.00) per month, he is left with Three
Seventy-jNine dollars

provide

food,

shelter,

($379.00)

per month to

clothing,

insurance,

transportation and miscellaneous

items

not only for

himself, but since he has been awarded the care of the
children for approximately One Hundred Forty (140) to One
Hundred Fifty (150) days each year, he must also provide
for them.

Such a result is grossly unfair, particularly

in light of the fact that such an award will leave
Plaintiff with almost One Thousand Eight Hundred dollars
($1,800.00) per month as available income.

That amount

far exceeds the old family units income with one less
member.

Such an income to her will not allow her to

continue the life style she was used to after Five (5)
years of marriage, but will significantly

improve it

while making it impossible for Defendant to survive.
Such a result has never been the law in the state.
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The amount claimed by Plaintiff's interpretation of
the Court's order, i.e., Eight Hundred Sixty dollars
($860.00) is uncollectable under both state and federal
law.

such an amount is equal to approximately Sixty-Five

percent

(65%)

of

Defendants

Section

62A-;ll-406

of

net

the Utah

disposable
code

income.

requires

compliance of Fifteen (15) U.S.C., Section 1673(b).

the
That

Federal law limits garnishment for purposes of child
support and alimony to a maximum of Fifty
Defendant's

income.

Therefore, should

(50%) of the
Defendant be

either unwilling or in this case unable to pay the amount
proposed by Plaintiff, that amount would be uncollectable
under both State and Federal law.
Reliance on the currently established child support
guidelines is also improper given the current level of
visitation granted to Defendant.

Paragraph Ten (10) of

the "Overview" of those guidelines specifies that those
guidelines should not apply in cases where one parent has
the children more than Thirty-Five percent (35%) of the
time.

A calculation based on the requirements of this

section would place the award of child support for
Defendant at Three Hundred Ten dollars

($310.00) per

month for the three children.
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While day care in the Montessori school system for
all three of the Wilson children may be desirable, it is
clear that it is a luxury that this family cannot afford.
They now have a c o m b i n e d
approximately

gross family

Two T h o u s a n d

($2.600.00) per month

income of

Six H u n d r e d

dollars

before taxes and approximately Two

Thousand Two Hundred dollars ($2,200.00) per month after
taxes.

Divide this between households and they are each

going to have some difficulty providing necessities.

Any

day care considered for the children should be based on
the older two children being in public school and the
youngest being watched by a neighbor at a reasonable
rate.

Further consideration should be given to the fact

that Defendant's work schedule would allow him to care
for his own children during much of the daytime hours.
Point Three
The Court has awarded one half (1/2) of Defendant's
IRA account and one half (1/2) of Defendant's Ready Asset
account to Plaintiff together with the home, Sixty-Five
percent

(65%) of the equity in a Blazer automobile and

Five Thousand dollars ($5,000.00) in Attorney's fees.
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4-$3

Reviewing
find

the

the t o t a l

assets

available

to Defendant,

following:
Home
Blazer
IRA
Ready A s s e t

Cash

Assets

approximately
the Order

$27,800
10,000
14,000*
2,000*
$53,800

available

Sixteen

appears

pay t o P l a i n t i f f

to

Thousand

at

this

*Approximate

the

dollars

time,

the following

Given

that

Defendant

Sixteen

Thousand

awarded

to

Plaintiff

additional

($3,500.00)

Thousand
In

Sixty-^Five

satisfy

the

dollar

addition

which

Three

which

Additionally,

would
this

all

is

to

has

Defendant

available

Five

does

left

to

($7,000.00)

loan

owing

award,

the

percent
preclude

above
(65%)

of

to

to

him

the

Court

has

cash

assets

and

Hundred

not

has

the

ordered

$1,000
7,000
6,500
5,000
$19,500

Defendant's

Thousand

Court

As

amounts:

($16,000.00),
of

equal

($16,000.00).

Defendant

only

dollars

Amounts

Defendant

1/2 of t h e IRA
1/2 of t h e R e a d y A s s e t a c c o u n t
65% of t h e B l a z e r ' s v a l u e
A t t o r n e y ' s Fees
T o t a l Award t o P l a i n t i f f

an

we

even

j u d g e m e n t and f o r c e

possess.

Defendant
to

from

ever

him i n t o

the

his

Court

Defendants

Defendant

dollars

Seven

parents.
has

future
being

taken

earnings
able

to

poverty.
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Defendant prays that the Court will reconsider

its

current Memorandum decision in light of the above facts.
Consideration should also be given to the short-term
nature of the marriage, the wife's college education and
the fact that she simply grew tired of the marriage she
had originally desired.
Dated this /Q ^ a y of April, 1989.

the Defendant
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Kent M. Kasting (1772)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Defendant
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELIZABETH A. WILSON,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT
PENDING APPEAL

Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,

Civil No. D-88-642

Defendant.

Honorable John A. Rokich
ooOoo

COMES NOW, the defendant and Pursuant to Rule 62 (d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves the Court for an Order
staying execution of any judgments in connection with the Decree
of Divorce entered in the above-entitled matter on April 26, 1989,
and more particularly, staying the requirements and payments
imposed upon the defendant under paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 &
23 of the Decree of Divorce.

This motion is made for the reason

that the defendant has appealed the Trial Court's decision as it
relates

to

the

support

property

and

debt

distribution

and

attorneys' fees awards to the Utah Court of Appeals and a final
distribution of the assets in question would not be appropriate
until the appeal in this matter has been concluded. A copy of the

Notice of Appeal has been attached to this Motion and marked
Exhibit "A."
In support of this Request for Stay of Execution, the
defendant proposes that he post as a supersedious bond a $15,000
irrevocable letter of credit from First National Bank & Trust
Company, a copy of which is attached to this Motion and marked
Exhibit "B."

Upon approval of the proposed bond, the defendant

will deposit the original letter of credit with the Court to be
held pending a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the defendant moves the Court for an Order staying
execution of the judgments created under paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17,
18 & 23 of the Decree of Divorce in this matter and that the Court
approve the posting of the supersedious bond which has been
proposed by the defendant to wit: a $15,000 irrevocable letter of
credit from First National Bank & Trust Company, and that the
plaintiff be ordered not to execute on any such judgments until the
appellate process in this matter has been completed and for such
other relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.
Dated:

May ^Q_ 1989.
DART, ADAM50N & KASTING

/Kent M. Kas
Attorneys for Defc

A-$-(e

TmVc? tJuZ'Ci&l District

Q\
JUDITH RQMNEY WOLBACH (3534)
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6222
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH A. WILSON,

NOTICE OF PARTIAL SATISFACTION
OF JUDGMENT & PROPERTY TRANSFER

Plaintiff,
VSe

Civil No. D-88-642
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON,
Judge John A. Rokich
Defendant.
This is to certify that on May 12, 1989, the defendant took from the
plaintiff's possession the 1987 Blazer which was awarded to him in the Decree
of Divorce, and that on or about that date the defendant paid to the plaintiff
the sum of $6,500.00, which was awarded to her in the Decree of Divorce for
her interest in said vehicle.
DATED: June 6, 1989.

<N Jl, ,tii sa(/id>L
JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH
Attorney for Plaintiff

SIGNED AND SWORN to before me on June

, 1989.

fcDTARY' PUBLIC /"residing in
Salt Lake County S^ate of Utah.
My conmission expires:

A-S-l

